Goldmann on Lukacs & Heidegger

[Ralph Dumain]

On Lucien Goldmann's LUKACS AND HEIDEGGER: TOWARDS A NEW PHILOSOPHY 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979):

I know a bit about Goldmann's literary theory, but I still don't have 
enough overall context to place his attitude towards this subject matter, 
which is mostly about basic philosophical issues, except for a brief 
excursion into Goldmann's literary terrain.  The biggest unknown as far as 
this book is concerned is Goldmann's attitude toward the later Lukacs and 
by extension towards Lukacs' view of the younger Lukacs.  This book 
concentrated exclusively on the Young Lukacs up to the historical moment of 
HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS.  The early Lukacs is the basis of the 
comparison with Heidegger.  Goldmann has obviously infused his views with 
some brand of Hegelianism.  He sees Lukacs and Heidegger both outgrowths of 
this tradition; it's what they share even in their mutual opposition.

For Heidegger the historical subject is the individual.  For Lukacs it is 
social classes, which Goldmann also suspiciously names the "transindividual 
subject." [p. 8]  Lukacs adopts the Hegelian notion that history of the 
realization of the idea of freedom.  For Heidegger there is only 
authenticity and inauthenticity and a Romantic view of history.  For Lukacs 
there is no difference between the human sciences and 
philosophy.  Heidegger's strict separation of the two is correlated to his 
interest in elites alone as positive historical actors.  Both are 
antipositivists, but for Lukacs the dividing line is between the natural 
and human sciences. [pp. 8-9]  I'm skipping over Goldmann's remarks on 
language and the rest of this introductory chapter.  There is another 
important point made, however.  There is an analogous relationship between 
the two thinkers and the dictatorships to which they rallied, Stalin's and 
Hitler's, which failed to live up to the principles their would-be 
philosophers set down for them.  [pp. 16-17]

The next chapter is on reification, zuhandenheit, and praxis.  Goldmann 
begins with the controversial claim that Heidegger alludes to Lukacs in 
BEING AND TIME and is concerned with refuting him. [p. 27]

The following chapter is on totality, being, and history.  Lukacs' notion 
of collective praxis is not to be found in Heidegger, who is still mired in 
various dualisms, including science vs. philosophy and the ontological vs. 
the ontic.  Heidegger has no real explanation for the social world of 
inauthenticity.  Goldmann gives priority to Lukacs in formulating the basic 
ideas of modern existentialism in THE SOUL AND THE FORMS. [p. 45]  Already 
Lukacs breaks with Kierkegaard, and questions western individualism while 
criticizing inauthentic life. [pp. 46ff]   Both Lukacs and Heidegger see 
meaning in relation to the collective subject or the individual dasein, but 
Lukacs sees mediation between the immediate given and the 
totality.  Without this, there are only the formalist historical 
classifications or irrationalist views of history. [p. 50]

The following chapter is about objective possibility and possible 
consciousness.  In striving for its maximum possible consciousness, the 
petit bourgeoisie, unable to grasp the totality, ends up joining the class 
with the strongest position.  This is revealed in the uneasy relationship 
of writers to political orders.  Ilya Ehrenburg rallies behind or 
criticizes Stalinism; Kastner has a parallel relationship with Nazism. [p. 57]

This latter point is interesting but I find it very fishy.  To me all this 
idealist talk about collective subjects is suspect. And while it's true 
that the petit bourgeoisie has trouble grasping the whole, the marginalized 
position of deracinated intellectuals has its advantages.  It's interesting 
that Richard Wright (in his still unpublished writings of the 1930s), who 
came from the bottom rung of society, thought that this marginalized 
intermediate position could give one a privileged vantage point.

For some reason I marked a discussion of Rosa Luxemburg viz. Lenin on class 
alliances, spontaneity and the party,  and the possible consciousness of 
social classes. [p. 65]  Lukacs' HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS is seen as 
essentially Luxemburgian. [p. 58]

The theme of the next chapter is subject-object and function.  Here we get 
a precis of Goldmann's famous analysis of Pascal and the Jansenists.  It 
seems to me this analysis stands on its own regardless of what thinks about 
the basic philosophical postulates of collective subjects and the 
like.  Goldmann ends up addressing the general question of meaning and the 
dilemmas involved, for example, in Althusser, who poses the alternative of 
Spinoza vs. Feuerbach, interpreted in dubious ways.  This somehow ends up 
as a choice between mechanism and idealism, a dichotomy which plagues the 
history of Marxism as well as social science in general. [pp. 76-77]  Both 
Hegel and Marx reject this dichotomy.  Then there is a return to the 
discussion of Jansenism, and eventually of contradiction and coherence in 
world views. [p. 83]

The fifth chapter of this section of the book is on the topicality of the 
question of the subject.  This is where the discussion of Adorno, already 
summarized, takes place.  This is preceded by an analysis of the social 
genesis of Althusserianism and the rebellion against existentialism, which 
also correlates to the post-war stabilization of capitalism. [p. 89]

The book's final chapter, being and dialectics, sums up everything I find 
obnoxious in it.  The collective subject, totality, and subject-object 
identity do not in my opinion provide an adequate ontological foundation, 
though this framework makes sense up to a point.  Goldmann concerns himself 
with the problem of adequation of scientific knowledge, but his bearing 
toward the subject-object relation obviates a standard materialist/realist 
view.

Goldmann is quite willing to criticize Stalinism, admit the difficulties of 
revolutionary prospects in the current situation (1960s), and so 
forth.  And of course he is not shy about linking Heidegger to 
Hitler.  Goldmann is pretty much silent about the late Lukacs and Lukacs' 
repudiation of the young Lukacs.  And I think this is the major symptom of 
my puzzlement over this book.  Goldmann criticizes both Lukacs and 
Heidegger, but is also sympathetic to both on some level.  But ultimately 
on what basis?  The basis looks suspicious to me. Furthermore, while it is 
a standard cliche of the artificial construct known as "Western Marxism" to 
excoriate dialectical materialism and link it to Stalinist orthodoxy,  my 
own opinion is that idealism is just as or more congenial to 
Stalinism.  Early Lukacs with his collective subject and subject-object 
identity seems to be _more_ conducive to Stalinism in some respects than 
something like THE DESTRUCTION OF REASON,  which comes into being with 
Stalin's gun pointed to Lukacs' head.  Hence Goldmann's ontological 
foundation, the basis for his sympathy to these two figures, and his 
silence about the later Lukacs, all place a question mark over this book.