Lebensphilosophie (was: Summary of Jargon...)

Ralph Dumain rdumain at igc.org
Sat, 10 May 2003 10:24:27 -0400


A brief response on the fly:

(1) No, Farber by no means lumps Heidegger and Husserl together, quite the 
opposite.  However, the historical connection is obvious.  I wrote a post 
on this for my marxistphilosophy list which I can forward to this one.

(2) Strangeness of F.S. materialism: it seems that Horkheimer and Adorno 
and several others went down the "Continental" philosophy road: i.e. they 
absorbed the heritage of German idealism and then rebelled against it by 
way of Marxism and materialism.  But ontologically, it's not the sort of 
materialism positively constructed, as say dialectical materialism, 
Sellars' critical realism, or other variants of ontological 
materialism.    Positive materialism is also very much engaged with the 
sciences or the philosophical issues arising therefrom.  You will notice H 
& A dancing around these issues: they try to be pro-science but are 
uncomfortable venturing into this area; rather, they focus on a critique of 
positivism.  I've been suggesting all along that this is a very important 
nuance that we must be very conscious of now, especially with a view to 
overcoming the artificial academic divisions of knowledge, which also 
express themselves in the bogus categories of "western" and "orthodox" Marxism.

(3) Reactionary lebensphilosophie: where do I begin?

(4) Lukacs: I'm flabbergasted here.  Lukacs' "stalinist pamphlet" is his 
thickest book, several hundred pages and very expensive in English.  Lukacs 
was hardly an obscurantist; he opposed obscurantism root and branch.  The 
influence of Stalinism needs to be looked at closely.  Three areas to 
investigate: (1) Lukacs' repudiation of his early work; (2) his style and 
polemics in his later period, taking into account that he was risking his 
life even to write the material he did in spite of his concessions to 
Stalinist rhetoric; (3) his conservative literary tastes and opposition to 
literary modernism.  I would say that (3) is what matters most, i.e. that 
is intellectually compromising.   However, a few qualifications: Lukacs 
preferred 19th century literature to the modern stuff even without 
Stalinism.  Lukacs also raises a legitimate issue via the opposition of 
abstract vs. concrete potentiality.

As for the living human body, this is what fascist intellectuals love to 
remind us of as they grovel before naked power.  Here's what Lukacs has to 
say about this:

"The abandonment of the old downright idealism had been anticipated even in 
the middle of the last century by petty-bourgeois asceticism. Ever since 
Nietzsche, the body (Leib) has played a leading role in bourgeois 
philosophy. The new philosophy needs formulae which recognize the primary 
reality of the body and the joys and dangers of bodily existence, without, 
however, making any concessions to materialism. For at the same time 
materialism was becoming the world view of the revolutionary proletariat. 
That made a position such as Gassendi and Hobbes look impossible for 
bourgeois thinkers. Although the method of idealism had been discredited by 
the realities of the time, its conclusions were held indispensable. This 
explains the need for the "third way" in the bourgeois world of the 
imperialist period."

See Lukacs' essay "Existentialism', published, incidentally, in Sellars, 
Fraber, & McGill's pioneering PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUTURE (1949), which sank 
like a stone in the McCarthy era:

http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/lukacsx1.html

See also my Positivism vs Life Philosophy (Lebensphilosophie) Study Guide:
http://www.autodidactproject.org/guidlebn.html


At 03:18 PM 5/10/2003 +0300, j laari wrote:
>Greetings!
>
>Ralph, few questions:
>
> >  Farber was very
> > critical of Husserl's subjective idealism but took his usable techniques
> > seriously.  Farber, however, had nothing but contempt for Heidegger.
>
>How Husserl and Heidegger belong together? Is it Farber's idea to
>think of them as representing same philosophical standpoint?
>
> > We need to remember that Adorno and Horkheimer were
> > materialists, though strange materialists (...)
>
>Where was the strangeness of their materialism (theoretically, I
>mean)?
>
> > However, there were other anti-positivist materialists (e.g. a
> > whole lineage in the USA) who developed independently of Marxism though
> > were ultimately sympathetic, like Sellars and Farber. They criticized both
> > positivism and reactionary lebensphilosophie.
>
>What was 'reactionary lebensphilosophie'? How do you understand 100
>years old philosophy of life, "Lebensphilosophie"?
>
>I think the main reason for the contempt of Lebensphilosophie is
>Lukacs' stalinist pamphlet (you've been referring to during the recent
>years). The problem with such a mockery is that it gives a totally
>false presentation of Lebensphilosophie as philosophical standpoint.
>After all, what reactionary is with a view, that phenomenal and
>experiential "world" is grounded on (and comes up from) "life" that
>actually means a living human body? You should take a look at Rudolph
>Weingartner's "Experience and culture. The philosophy of Georg Simmel"
>(1962). Weingartner gives probably the best - the most advanced -
>interpretation of Simmel's philosophy that was the culmination of the
>Lebensphilosophie. Another example of strange materialism, I'd say.
>Today, of course, it's as outdated as any standpoint from previous
>centuries. However, 100 years ago it was progressive moment in
>philosophy.
>
>I think that Adorno despised Lukacs with a good reason; he wasn't only
>a pathetic political arriviste, but also a philosophical obscurantist.
>
>Sincerely, Jukka L