Fwd: [marxistphilosophy] Marvin Farber: Naturalism &

[Ralph Dumain]

>Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 14:26:18 -0400
>Subject: [marxistphilosophy] Marvin Farber: Naturalism & Subjectivism
>Reply-To: marxistphilosophy@yahoogroups.com
>
>Marvin Farber was one of the greatest figures of phenomenology; he may have
>even been largely responsible for introducing it to the United States.  But
>he was also one its most trenchant critics, as a materialist with strong
>sympathies for Marxism.  Farber eventually saw tow basic alternatives for
>modern philosophy, as expressed in the title of his 1959 book, NATURALISM
>AND SUBJECTIVISM.  Farber attacks Husserl's subjective idealism
>strenuously, though he is interested in utilizing whatever is
>methodologically salvageable from Husserl's philosophy.
>
>Of particular interest is the late 19th-century context out of which
>Husserl emerged.  His twin enemies were naturalism and empiricism,
>which  evidently reigned at the time.  As science and the philosophy
>allegedly inspired by science encroached on the domain of consciousness,
>the domain of thought, including logic itself, was in danger of absorption
>by "psychologism."  Husserl sought to reverse this encroachment with an
>attack on the "natural attitude."  Farber analyzes Husserl's framework to
>determine its fundamental flaws and faulty suppositions.  Of great interest
>here would be to analyze the situation at the time of Husserl's emergence
>more closely, and to ask the question: why did empiricism have to dominate
>the philosophy of the sciences, with the elimination of the "ideal" (to use
>a Soviet expression) as a consequence?  Surely Engels could not have been
>the sole alternative, though if he was, more power to him.  As for
>"naturalism", it is one of those weasel words that can mean all sorts of
>things, which is why materialists should eschew it.  Anyway, I can't stress
>enough the dynamic apparently at work here: empiricism as the basis of
>scientism, and the aggressive subjectivism of the philosophy of
>consciousness as its antagonist.  Husserl was certainly on a higher plane
>than most subjectivists, and one might propose  that phenomenology was the
>most sophisticated and serious contender of our time.  I'm sure Farber must
>have appreciated this (see p. 269), though I don't yet see Farber exploring
>the ideology of 19th century empiricism in great historical detail in this
>book.
>
>Another weasel word that Farber attacks is "transcendence", which generates
>undertones with vague emotional appeal as well as a range of technical
>meanings (p. 263).  Later, he states: "The term 'transcendental' is one of
>the most objectionable terms derived from the speculative tradition." (p.
>287)  Husserl then gets a serious ass-kicking in a section titled "The
>Transcendental Dimension and the Treatment of History" (p. 287-295).
>
>After analyzing Husserl for almost 300 pages, Farber then devotes a whole
>chapter to the phenomenologist Max Scheler.  Although he drew from Marx,
>Scheler is seen as a precursor of Nazism. (p. 297-299)  Scheler was a
>leader in the anti-naturalistic movement, with connections to Catholicism
>as well.  Scheler particularly opposed naturalistic ethics and
>psychological explanations (e.g. of love and marriage).
>
>After establishing that the phenomenological movement could attract such
>diverse followers with such diverse perspectives and aims (p. 328), Farber
>devotes his penultimate chapter to "the new irrationalism: the influence of
>Husserl's subjectivism."  Existentialist tendencies proved to be equally
>pliable.  The next major target is of course Heidegger.  Husserl at least
>had a considerable command of mathematics and the sciences, but Heidegger
>had nothing to draw upon for his antiscientific propaganda, and amply
>demonstrates his intelllectual inferiority. (p. 335-8) Heidegger's
>superficial and confused notions of "nothing" and "truth" are analyzed, as
>well as his devious and duplicitous manipulation  of other
>keywords.  Heidegger bleongs more to the world of religion than to reason,
>though he did not declare himself specifically in that realm. (p.
>352)  Husserl's marginalia on Heidegger reveal Husserl's dissatisfaction
>with Heidegger's lack of clarity, for his "theological-ethical talk", and
>for an affinity with Thomism. (See pp. 356-365.  See also p. 353 for
>Heidegger on Husserl.)
>
>Heidegger's innovative jargon culminates in the vapid work of Oskar Becker,
>of "paratranscendence" fame.  Jaspers and Marcel get theirs next.  Finally,
>there is a section on Sartre's "avoidance of materialism>' (p. 373-376)  In
>conclusion: "... Sartre is a non-materialistic non-fideist; and he has
>succeeded in bringing down an unusually large part of the ideological world
>upon his subjectivistic (alias existentialistic) head." (p. 376)
>
>The final chapter, an epilogue, is on "Subjectivism on the
>Defensive."  Criticism of phenomenology came from diverse quarters, even
>from Driesch (p. 378-9).  Ironically, Farber comes in for criticism from
>Soviet philosopher B.E. Bykovsky for attempting to "avoid the reactionary
>consequences of phenomenology" and to "cultivate phenomenology without
>raising its fruits."  Farber defends himself by insisting that, while he
>rejects phenomenology as a global philosophy, he accepts useful techniques
>from it on a limited basis. (pp. 380-3).  Farber winds up with his
>philosophy of philosophy.  His final word: "A lasting bulwark of defense
>against all falsifiers and traducers of reason is guaranteed by the
>well-founded prestige of the sciences, and the undeniable interests of
>mankind." (p. 386)