[FRA:] Secularism, Utopia & the Discernment of Myth
Ralph Dumain
rdumain at autodidactproject.org
Sat Mar 28 07:06:07 GMT 2009
Boer, Roland. "Secularism, Utopia and the
Discernment of Myth," Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (Fall 2005).
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ijcs/secular/boer.htm
Roland Boer has written a number of books and
articles on Marxism and religion, and has a blog,
too. More on all that later. For the moment, this article . . .
Boer seeks a way to characterize properly the
free-lance sensibilities of contemporary
"spiritual experience". Four issues to address are:
secularism, post-structuralism, utopian
possibilities of religion, and the discernment of
myths (after Ernst Bloch). I'm guessing that he
really meant to write post-secularism rather than post-structuralism.
Post-secularism is manifested by the pervasive
practice of asserting that one is spiritual, not
religious. In the utopian realm, Boer seeks a
shared language of spiritual experiences that do
not erase differences. Secularism and
post-secularism are inseparable and dialectically
related. Contrary to the settled conception of
secularization now, the concept was much
contested in the 19th century prior to the
interventions of Max Weber and Karl Lowith.
Considering alternatives to the latter two, Boer
begins with Walter Benjamin (The Origin of German
Tragic Drama). Boer's description of Benjamin's
notion of secularization is unintelligible to me,
but it has something to do with the fall of
theological/historical time into spatialization
and taxonomy, termed "natural history".
Benjamin's work reveals that religion has been
(tacitly?) equated with Christianity, and
secularization effectively equals the negation of
Christianity. Religion is often assumed to
pertain to the supermundane, supernatural realm,
though it has taken on a broader meaning as well.
Boer is unclear here, but he mentions
anthropological studies and studies of religions
outside of Christianity (and Judaism). All the
analytical tools brought to bear on non-western
non-Christian belief systems are actually secular
translations of the categories of Christian religion.
Boer sees something pernicious in this,
apparently, but his next move is to shifts to a
discussion of Adorno's critiques of Kierkegaard
and Heidegger. Key here is that . . .
The language of theology, appropriated by
Heidegger and existentialism, has the distinct
ideological role of producing patterns of
subordination to an absolute authority, which
became fascism rather than God and the Church.
The theological language of existentialism -
which drew its sacredness from the cult of
authenticity rather than Christianity becomes,
for Adorno, an ideological schema particularly
suited to fascism, for which it functioned not so
much as an explicit statement, but as a refuge,
a mystification that gave voice to an ostensible
salvation from alienation that functioned as a
virulent justification of oppression, the
smoldering evil (Adorno 1965, 9) of fascism.
Boer equates this view to a critique of idolatry
one can find in Adorno's writings. Proceeding further . . .
Secularization then becomes a process riven with
contradictions, one whose rejection of
Christianity relies on Christianity, and this, I
would suggest, is one of the main reasons for the
fact that secularization never quite seemed to succeed . . .
Boer's overall argument doesn't make a bit of
sense to me. Mini-arguments here and there do,
but the overall structure of the argument doesn't
cohere. Here is one piece, though, that is
exceptionally lucid, and socially accurate:
The flowering of the myriad forms of religious
expression and experience for which the
secularization hypothesis could not account is
instead described in terms of spirituality, the
properly post-secular religion. I dont want to
trace the Christian history of the term
spirituality, but one of its features is that
it relies upon the widespread knowledge of a
whole range of religious practices that would not
have been possible without the study of religions
in the first place, without the endless
cataloguing and study of religions from the most
ancient, such as Sumeria and Babylon or
pre-historic humans, to the most contemporary
forms, such as the well-known Heavens Gate group
that committed suicide, all shod with Nike shoes,
when the comet Hale-Bopp appeared on earths
horizon. Apparently emptied of doctrines to which
one must adhere, or of institutions that
carefully guard salvation, or of specific groups
bound by language and ethnic identity,
spirituality enables one to recover lost or
repressed practices, such as Wicca or Yoruba
sacrifice, but to pick and choose elements that
seem to suit individual lifestyles or
predilections. It allows one to designate the
vitality of indigenous religions (which are no
longer religion but spirituality), as a lost
source of connectedness with the land, with
nature, or other human beings. Unfortunately,
however, spiritualitys private piety and
devotion comes at the expense of any collective
agenda. It also relies on both liberal pluralism
and tolerance, as well as the profound
reification of social and cultural life that is
everywhere around us. You can practice your own
particular spirituality in your small corner, as
long you dont bother me, we say. Like
secularization, spirituality itself depends upon
its own contradiction: both rely upon the religion they reject.
This is a dead-on description of all the upper
middle class New Agers I've met in recent years.
Boer next shifts to a discussion of Utopia,
taking off from the thought of Ernst Bloch.
Again, there's a passage I can't make any sense out of:
What is often forgotten is that the hermeneutics
of suspicion and recovery in political approaches
such as feminism, post-colonial criticism and
liberation theology owe a debt to Bloch. It seems
to me that the effort to locate a shared language
of spiritual experience, one that is sensitive
to variations of social, political and cultural
difference, relies upon a utopian project in the best sense(s) of the term.
One of Bloch's central insights was not only to
discern utopian impulses, but to note that when
they include yearning for a lost golden age,
their regression has already set in. Utopianism should be future oriented.
A utopian hermeneutics seeks
The problem with seeking a shared language is
that religions embody mutually exclusive world
views. And there is no unmediated experience.
Attempts to transcend difference betray origins,
as is the case with Rudolph Otto.
Once again, Boer's logic eludes me, but his next
move is to seek a unifying principle in myth.
Even more than religion per se, the Enlightenment
target of secularization was myth, a term that
had acquired an unwieldy cluster of associations:
untruth, confusion, fuzzy thinking, the ideology
of oppression, and so on. Myth found itself
driven from town to town, expelled by the
enlightened burghers, only to retreat to the
forests and deserts, the realm of Nature, where a
few wayward individuals might have some use for
it. Faced with the use of myth by the Nazis and
other sundry fascists, with their notions of
blood and soil and the Blond Beast, Walter
Benjamin and Theodor Adorno saw only the negative
aspects of the term. For Benjamin, the ultimate
form of myth was capitalism, as he traced in The
Arcades Project (1999), and so he sought a way
beyond myth, a waking from the dream, that made
use of biblical motifs. Unfortunately, he
remained trapped within the myth of the Bible
itself. For Adorno (1999), myth was the
antithesis of utopia. Myth was the realm of the
unitary principle, the abolition of non-identity
that is characteristic of a world dominated by
men. For both Adorno and Benjamin, utopia meant the end of myth.
Boer prefers Bloch:
For Bloch, myth is neither pure false
consciousness that needs to be unmasked, nor a
positive force without qualification. Like
ideologies, all myths, no matter how repressive,
have an emancipatory-utopian dimension that
cannot be separated from deception and illusion.
Thus, in the very process of manipulation and
domination, myth also has a moment of utopian
residue, an element that opens up other
possibilities at the very point of failure. Bloch
is particularly interested in biblical myth, for
the subversive elements in the myths that
interest him are enabled by ideologies both repetitious and repressive.
Further down . . .
At his best, Blochs discernment of myth is an
extraordinary approach, for it enables us to
interpret the myths of any religion or
spirituality as neither completely reprehensible
nor utterly beneficial. That is to say, it is
precisely through and because of the myths of
dominance and despotism that those of cunning and
non-conformism can exist. It is not merely that
we cannot understand the latter without the
former, but that the former enables the latter.
Two examples from the Bible are given, the first
concerning Eden, the second, death.
In the end, then, the value of religions like
Christianity is that they have tapped into this
utopian desire for something beyond death. Their
mistake for Bloch is that they want to say
something definite about death. But that
something is hardly definite: it is mythology,
and for that we need a discerning eye that can
see both the liberating and repressive features of those myths.
I find Boer's conclusion most unsatisfactory and downright irritating:
If we follow through the dialectical relationship
between secularism and post-secularism - a
contradictory logic in which secularism turns out
to rely on the Christianity it everywhere denies,
a logic that appears starkly in a post-secularism
that cannot be thought without secularism - then
myth turns out to be the most urgent religious or
spiritual question for us. Rather than the
problem-ridden term spirituality, I have argued
that Blochs hermeneutics of the discernment of
myth provides not only a productive method, but
also an approach to the utopian desire that lies
behind any effort to find a shared religious or
spiritual language. Such a language needs to be
both critical and appreciative, for myths work in
an extremely cunning fashion. It is a process
that enables on the one hand the identification
of those myths, or even elements within a myth,
that are oppressive, misogynist, racist, that
serve a ruling elite, and on the other, those
which are subversive, liberating and properly
socialist or even democratic in other words, utopian.
I have a number of objections here, beginning
with another instance of a chronic lack of
logical clarity. How does Jewish secularism rely
on Christianity? Or Indian, or Japanese? Suppose
one rejects post-secular ideologies: New Age
spirituality, etc.? Then how is myth the most
urgent spiritual question, other than to
neutralize it? Why should there be a spiritual
language at all, shared or not? Why should
anything subversive, liberating, or socialist be
seen in mythical expressions in the 21st century?
There's not an atom of it that is progressive in
any way. Myth can only be productively scavenged
retrospectively, by those not under its grip.
Myth in any form is not adequate to the
comprehension of contemporary society.
Considering the problem more widely, popular
symbology simply can't encapsulate the truth
content of the state of our society at this time.
Indeed, after the waning of the various
countercultures of the 1950s-70s, I see nothing
left for popular mythology to do. The good
intentions of the past need to be salvaged as
well as criticized for their naivete. (I've
addressed this with respect to the individual
mysticisms of avant-garde jazz musicians.) What
myth is alive today needs to be killed off and
dissected. In any case, Boer should be more
clear and specific about what he's after.
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