myth and reason

[kenneth.mackendrick]

> > What I meant by mythic thinking is an individual who does not 
> > see or perceive any kind of logical space/time continuum or the
> > notion of causality. (...) 
> > I am a tree and the tree is me.  If the tree dies I will die -
> > because my soul resides in the tree. This is mythic thinking. 
> > The self is not distinguished from reality.  
> 
> I see your point. But isn't there, in your example, also identity of
> this mythological thinker independently of the tree? After all, he
> calls himself "I" and distinguishes himself from "tree" at the same
> time as he identifies himself with tree? Surely there has to be some 
> difference between I and reality? 

Yeah, you are correct - this example is poor.  How about this example: is
Vague but mystical for sure.

> > I would argue that thought cannot be boiled down to reason rather
> > desire itself is at the heart of the human subject - a desiring.
> 
> How is desire related to reason, on the one hand, and to thinking on
> the other? 
> 
> What is desire? Is there desire because of 'lack' or is it rather just 
> some kind of basic striving? 
> 
I still working on that.  I suspect it is something that cannot be reduced to either/or - 
rather both/and as well as either/or - let's let the particular indicate the what of 
desire.

> > Freud was wrong about religion, sexuality, women, etc. This will be
> > familiar ground to those who have studied Freud's critics - so I
> > won't go into too much detail. 
> 
> I had hoped you would go. I'm not very informed in recent criticisms
> of Freud. Somehow they seem to repeat the earlier ones that were quite
> often based on very straightforward interpretations. 

Following Juliet Mitchell - I think it is most provocative to treat Freud "not as a 
recommendation for a patriarchal society, but as an analysis of one" (Mitchell, 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism, 308).  Freud postulates a gender dualism which is 
based upon anatomical difference - a biology = destiny of sorts.  Freud reduces 
women, their emotional and moral character, their historical achievements, their 
capacity for social relationships to the absence of the male bodily organ (the 
equivalent of saying that women have "achieved" a less-than-human status).  What 
is going on here is that women appears to us in Freud (and Marx and Hegel) as a 
reified category "wherein the particular humanity of women dissolves into 
elements or principles of ontology and anthropology - whose aim is a greater 
understanding of masculine development..." (Hewitt, Critical Theory of Religion, 
70).  Thus - women are defined by a "series of lacks" (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 
Sexuality and Mind, 20).

On religion my thoughts are a bit more scattered.  Freud defines religion in the first 
place as a regressive activity.  In this way all religious activity is doomed to be 
regressive - despite the protests of liberation (Segundo, Gutierrez), feminist 
(Ruether, Daly, Fiorenza), political (Soelle, Metz, Moltmann), public (Tracy, Lamb, 
Fiorenza, Browning), negative/critical (Bultmann, Davis, Rubenstein), postmodern 
(Milbank, Taylor, Wyschogrod), communicative (Peukert), process (Whitney, Cobb, 
Davaney) theologians (the names are tossed in deliberately to indicate the 
disneying debates most of which don't really discuss the/a deity at all).  For a 
"believer" obviously Freud's comments on religion are unacceptable.  So, in the 
same way that he debases women - he debased religionists.  Besides - what the 
hell is religion anyway.

This is NOT to say that Freud hasn't said intelligent things about women and 
religion.  I'm simply pointing out, out of context, some of the problems that others 
have pointed out.

> Especially, when it comes to religion and sexuality, together as well
> as on their own, it was just Freud who opened up the most fruitful
> ways for analysing them. Religion as social institution reflecting the
> social landscapes around it; sexuality as partly socially shaped;
> weird ways these two get together on individual level... resulting in
> fascinating forms imagination... Are you sure you won't share your
> knowledge on critiques of Freud? These are, after all, crucial issues
> even today. 

Yes... especially if you follow Mitchell and the Frankfurt School theorists.  I still 
love Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion.

> > The mystical basis for subjectivity appears when the
> > concrete particular, the nonidentical, seeps into our categories.  
> > A theological premise is revealed (sometimes) whenever our categories
> > are used in an essentialist or functionalist way. 
> 
> I don't grasp that. Mystical basis appears when the non-identical
> seeps into categories? What that means? Is it bad? Theological premise
> is revealed whenever there's essentialist or functionalist use of
> categories: will you explain? 

The way I see it, and this is a propositional truth claim, there are three primary 
interpretations of language.  The strictly positivist - words and categories directly 
correspond to their intended object - metaphysics, theology, scientism, etc).  
Functionalism - where terms are defined ahead of time and possess no truth value 
at all (eg. defining something functionally - "this is how i will use the term religion" 
 - which indicates that the intended object of study may not exist at all but when 
shaped in this particular way it looks like this... (characteristic of pragmatism).  And 
finally - my favorite - dialectical or propositional - where terms point to something 
which is real but cannot immediately be know through language itself since 
language is fundamentally different from the reality it seeks to represent.  
Habermas's uses this idea in his theory of communicative action, Adorno takes 
hold of the non-identical, Derrida grasps at differance, Horkheimer looks looks at 
dialectics and critical theory etc.  See Horkheimer's essay on truth for one of the 
best explanations of this stuff.

The reason why I think identity thinking is ground in mysticism is because it relies 
upon personal experience yet posits metaphysical universals from within the 
particular by dissolving the tension between the two.  The dialectical tension 
between language and reality, identity and non-identity breaks this mysticism.

> In general, I'd be grateful if you would clarify your concept of
> mystical. Also you seem to give to 'theological' interesting meaning,
> for example when you wrote that it means "talk from perspective of
> God" and gave a condition that one has to be religious - "talk about
> God" - in order to think theologically. Now you don't have to be
> religious, and you don't have to believe in any god, in order to study
> or practice theology. It's just a discipline that revolves around the
> concept of god (damn Aristotle when he named the first mover as
> 'deus'/god...) so I'm afraid that theologicians don't pretend they've
> reached god's perspective. Rather they put 'god' in perspective. 

Theologians are a funny bunch.  Theology is basically a term created by the 
christian church for the christian church (as far as i can see).  MOST theologians 
compare theology to science - but their are several fundamental differences.  
Theology is based upon a faith in the authority of the church, the revelation 
inherent in scripture etc.  It is sanctioned by a legislative body of elders (or 
whatever).  It is ground in the objective experience of a divine being working within 
nature, history, humanity etc.  Within theology this premise is not open to question. 
 As far as i know science does not possess such rigid criteria - and no institutions 
exist to sanctify what is true once and for all.  Whenever an appeal is made to the 
deity it becomes totally incompatible with reason - because it is based solely upon 
faith.  Now a great many "theologians" don't write like this, so in effect the are not 
writing theology.  Look at the work of Rosemary Ruether.  She doesn't talk about 
the deity - she talks about politics, liberation, suffering etc.  God/dess is barely 
mentioned in any of her work.  She calls herself a theologian but she's actually 
writing social theory.  Get her in a pub and i'm sure she would admit this.  Segundo 
is explicit about this.  Segundo talks about the liberation of theology rather than 
liberation theology.  The difference is crucial.  Segundo is aware that theology 
restrains social thought in an irrational and authoritative way - so he tries to 
unlatch theology from within (a good hegelian-marxian thinker segundo).
 
> > What I wonder about all this is whether all criticism is implicitly
> > a form of mysticism - since it depends upon the individual
> > subjective experience which then makes sweeping universal claims -
> > which are safeguarded by saying other perspectives are alientated,
> > reified, or deceived.  The idea of science as religion, society as
> > implicitly religious, the self as spiritual, humanity as sacred etc.
> > all point in this direction. 
> 
> Huh?  
> I've read the posts of last few days now, and still I'm in darkness. I
> simply don't grasp that.

I think Michael Salter appropriately criticized this point.

> You seem to be referring to my effort of questioning the view
> according to it Freud's theories were some sort of mysticism? I fail
> to see on what ground you interpret that i've blamed criticism to be
> mysticism. No way! However, you also refer to Habermas' idea of the
> lifeworld. Probably you were after all characterising criticism in
> general? In that case I give up. I don't get the picture and I can't
> accept such generalisations as "society as implicitly religious".

Why not?  Society is very very religious.  The myth of evolution is just as divinely 
sanctioned as the myth in genesis, the christians are still trying to take christmas 
back from the transnations, we stage pilgrimages to sacred musicians - hollowed 
movies...  we "believe" in the economy and the necessity of private property.  
Capitalism and democracy are wonderful religious ceremonies.  Try arguing 
against democracy in favour of anarchism sometime... or point out that technology 
might not save us from death... or that universities might be training grounds for 
corporate leadership...  Even the statement "I can't accept such generalisations..." 
is fairly religious.  Why not?  Liberation might be an illusion.  I'm fairly religious in 
this regard - I refuse to accept things the way they are.  Why?  Back to the politics 
of desire - in a great deal of tension with rational thought.

afternote:

I guess I would posit that the levelling out of tension is mystical - which is bound 
by a model of authority - whether in fascism, theology, or positivism.  It is mystical 
because it completely relies upon blind faith rather than reason, conversation, 
debate, or openness.

yours in great length,
ken