myth and reason

[j laari]

Ken, 

sorry for delay. I finally managed to get back on line. Here's some
remarks.

> What I meant by mythic thinking is an individual who does not 
> see or perceive any kind of logical space/time continuum or the
> notion of causality. (...) 
> I am a tree and the tree is me.  If the tree dies I will die -
> because my soul resides in the tree. This is mythic thinking. 
> The self is not distinguished from reality.  

I see your point. But isn't there, in your example, also identity of
this mythological thinker independently of the tree? After all, he
calls himself "I" and distinguishes himself from "tree" at the same
time as he identifies himself with tree? Surely there has to be some 
difference between I and reality? 


> I'm not sure that the concept of desire contradicts Horkeheimer's
> and Adorno's work (...)

It seemed to me you suggested exactly that. 


> I would argue that thought cannot be boiled down to reason rather
> desire itself is at the heart of the human subject - a desiring.

How is desire related to reason, on the one hand, and to thinking on
the other? 

What is desire? Is there desire because of 'lack' or is it rather just 
some kind of basic striving? 


> I think Horkheimer and Adorno's idea of subjectivity is incomplete
> and based upon a kind of teleology that yields dangerous
> prescriptions. (..) The presupositions about "man" are what I am
> concerned with here (...) In many ways traditional critical theory
> is based upon a conception of "man" as white, male, theistic,
> heterosexual etc. (...) Freud makes similar mistakes. 

I don't know A&H well enough or I just hesitate to say anything
definite about Dialectic of Enlightenment. However, I do believe that
there are good reasons to criticize both frankfurters and Freud though
I wouldn't say categorically that they're wrong or they made mistakes.
It's also a question of interpretation (major point for me is that
they all have taken some crucial steps forwards in both inner-wordly
thinking, so to speak, and in developing strategies in critical
thinking). Discussions by and around Lacan, for example, have proved
quite well that Freud wasn't such a simplistically biological thinker
as some more empiristically oriented critics have assumed. What seems
to be a reference to some natural or biological forces turns out to be
a laborously developed concept concerning some psychic function or
process. (I mean his 'metapsychology'.) 


> Freud was wrong about religion, sexuality, women, etc. This will be
> familiar ground to those who have studied Freud's critics - so I
> won't go into too much detail. 

I had hoped you would go. I'm not very informed in recent criticisms
of Freud. Somehow they seem to repeat the earlier ones that were quite
often based on very straightforward interpretations. 

Especially, when it comes to religion and sexuality, together as well
as on their own, it was just Freud who opened up the most fruitful
ways for analysing them. Religion as social institution reflecting the
social landscapes around it; sexuality as partly socially shaped;
weird ways these two get together on individual level... resulting in
fascinating forms imagination... Are you sure you won't share your
knowledge on critiques of Freud? These are, after all, crucial issues
even today. 

I didn't had much problems with Freud's conception of women until
feminist critiques shaked my convictions. Once again, question of
interpretation creeps in... Today there are Lacan-oriented feminists
and female researchers who fight happily with other forms of feminism
and defend Freud...


> The mystical basis for subjectivity appears when the
> concrete particular, the nonidentical, seeps into our categories.  
> A theological premise is revealed (sometimes) whenever our categories
> are used in an essentialist or functionalist way. 

I don't grasp that. Mystical basis appears when the non-identical
seeps into categories? What that means? Is it bad? Theological premise
is revealed whenever there's essentialist or functionalist use of
categories: will you explain? 

In general, I'd be grateful if you would clarify your concept of
mystical. Also you seem to give to 'theological' interesting meaning,
for example when you wrote that it means "talk from perspective of
God" and gave a condition that one has to be religious - "talk about
God" - in order to think theologically. Now you don't have to be
religious, and you don't have to believe in any god, in order to study
or practice theology. It's just a discipline that revolves around the
concept of god (damn Aristotle when he named the first mover as
'deus'/god...) so I'm afraid that theologicians don't pretend they've
reached god's perspective. Rather they put 'god' in perspective. 


> What I wonder about all this is whether all criticism is implicitly
> a form of mysticism - since it depends upon the individual
> subjective experience which then makes sweeping universal claims -
> which are safeguarded by saying other perspectives are alientated,
> reified, or deceived.  The idea of science as religion, society as
> implicitly religious, the self as spiritual, humanity as sacred etc.
> all point in this direction. 

Huh?  

I've read the posts of last few days now, and still I'm in darkness. I
simply don't grasp that.

You seem to be referring to my effort of questioning the view
according to it Freud's theories were some sort of mysticism? I fail
to see on what ground you interpret that i've blamed criticism to be
mysticism. No way! However, you also refer to Habermas' idea of the
lifeworld. Probably you were after all characterising criticism in
general? In that case I give up. I don't get the picture and I can't
accept such generalisations as "society as implicitly religious".

Yours, Jukka L