[FRA:] Horkheimer;s moral philosophy

[Ralph Dumain]

J. C. Berendzen <http://philpapers.org/s/J.%20C.%20Berendzen> (2010). 
Suffering and Theory: Max Horkheimer's Early Essays and Contemporary 
Moral Philosophy. 
<http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/9/1019?rss=1>/Philosophy 
and Social Criticism/ 36 (9):1019-1037.

I thought I had written about this, but apparently I got distracted by 
more urgent tasks immediately after reading it a couple months ago. 
Here's the abstract for starters:

    *Abstract*
    Max Horkheimer does not generally receive the scholarly attention
    given to other 'Frankfurt School' figures. This is in part because
    his early work seems contradictory, or unphilosophical. For example,
    Horkheimer seems, at various points (to use contemporary metaethical
    terms), like a constructivist, a moral realist, or a moral skeptic,
    and it is not clear how these views cohere. The goal of this article
    is to show that the contradictions regarding moral theory exist
    largely on the surface, and that one can go below the surface to
    reconstruct a coherent position. Part I will examine Horkheimer's
    skeptical critique of morality, and show that it leads to the
    realist position discussed in part II. Part III then shows that such
    realism can only be understood within a larger constructivist
    project, which elaborates on a minimal normativity present in human
    experience. This reconstruction should make sense of Horkheimer's
    work, and show its contemporary relevance.

Actually, I like Horkheimer's work from the 1930s, but I think he blew 
his wad during that decade, and there's not much left after that. But I 
was always interested in his treatment of epistemology and metaphysics, 
never thought about moral theory, a subject that doesn't interest me 
anyway. Berendzen traces three phases or variations of the moral theory 
he find in Horkheimer, which B labels constructivist, realist, and 
skeptical positions.

I: Horkheimer's moral skepticism

In 'Materialism and Morality' H can be seen as a skeptic.  This 
involves, inter alia, an attack on Kant's untenable position. The 
critique of morality is bound up with the critique of idealism.

II: moral realism

Examples: /Dammerung/, 'Materialism and Metaphysics', viz. the emphasis 
on suffering, influence of Schopenhauer. Horkheimer:

    [The] materialist view has the negative significance that it rejects
    a metaphysically grounded morality. But in addition it has always
    meant to materialists that man's striving for happiness is to be
    recognized as a natural fact requiring no justification.

This, according to B, is a naturalistic, hence realist position. But is 
the desire for alleviation of suffering merely subjective and emotive? B 
argues no, citing the criterion of objective knowledge of social 
interests advocated in 'Traditional and Critical Theory', and also 
insisting on the collective nature of the struggle for well-being.   
Horkheimer is in fact pro-science, but not so in relation to the 
fragmented, detached role of the specialist.  For this latter reason, 
Horkheimer is carried beyong realism, and this leads to his 
constructivist dimension.

  III: Horkheimer's constructivism

H's 1935 essay 'On the Problem of Truth' is aggressively realist. Does 
this contradict his skepticism? B sees a link with constructivism. H 
modifies the correspondence theory of truth:

    This correspondence is neither a simple datum [nor] an immediate
    fact. . . . Rather, it is always established by real events and
    human activity. Already in the investigation and determination of
    facts, and even more in the verification of theories, a role is
    played by the direction of attention, the refinement of methods, the
    categorical structure of the subject matter -- in short, by human
    activity corresponding to the given social period.

B elaborates this position, but I lack the patience to do so. 
Comparisons are made with Rawls and others.

One can see the fusion of realist and constructivist elements, e.g.:

    But if [critical theory's] concepts, which sprang from social
    movements, today seem empty because no one stands behind them but
    its pursuing persecutors, yet the truth of them will out. For the
    thrust toward a rational society, which admittedly seems to exist
    today only in the realms of fantasy, is really innate in every man.
    . . . That is not a claim that should bring a sigh of relief. For
    the realization of possibilities depends on historical conflicts.
    The truth about the future does not take the form of a verification
    of data.


That's H. B says:

    Horkheimer's views are not, upon reflection, incoherent. He is a
    moral skeptic only insofar as he is skeptical of the idea that there
    are universal moral rules that moral philosophy can discern and then
    apply irrespective of particular circumstances. Such views are
    problematic not only for epistemological reasons (that they overlook
    the historical character of knowledge) but for broadly moral
    reasons. Their lack of attention to the problems faced by real,
    particular human beings leads to real suffering. The experience of
    suffering, and the desire for happiness, are empirical realities
    that motivate us to seek social change. But this motivation issues
    not universal oughts but only a weak normative force that must be
    fleshed out through the construction of a philosophically guided
    research program that can determine real strategies for working
    toward overcoming suffering.

B finds H's position appealing.  I take no position on B's 
interpretation; here I am just a reporter, however spotty my reportage.