[FRA:] Jarvis on Adorno: conclusion?

[Ralph Dumain]

Jarvis, Simon. Adorno: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity 
Press; New York; Routledge, 1998.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8--covering Adorno's core philosophy--were tough 
going at times, and have their moments of opacity, but they were 
quite instructive.  The concluding chapter, however, is a big 
disappointment, and shows where the big questions are shrunk to the 
constricted dimensions of academic navel-gazing. Jarvis begins with 
the key question: "What is living and what is dead in Adorno's 
thought?"  Instead of answering this question, he asks two more 
restricted questions: how does Adorno relate to (a) Habermas, (b) 
Derrida?  And if I don't give two flying fucks about either, then 
what has Jarvis to say to me?

The comparison between Adorno and Habermas is not crystal clear, 
though Jarvis does bring up points of contention.  Jarvis argues 
against charges of harmful utopianism in Adorno, though what the 
charge is supposed to mean is not made terribly lucid.  In turn, an 
Adornian perspective can be brought to bear upon Habermas' 
formalistic discursive proceduralism.  I find Habermas of limited 
value in any case, so OK.  But the contrast between the two doesn't 
mean much to me.  If it's a matter of contrasting a defective 
discourse ethics with a defective dialectic of enlightenment, why 
should I care at the end of the day, and how can this contrast answer 
the question of what lives and what is dated in Adorno's thought?

Jarvis contrasts negative dialectic and deconstruction in spite of 
putative similarities. Jarvis finds the same lapses in Derrida that 
Adorno found in Heidegger.  Could be, but that doesn't answer the 
question of what survives in Adorno, but only what Derrida (and 
Habermas) have not succeeded in killing off.

Then there is a section on the 'relation to empiricism'.  It begins 
with an objection to Horkheimer's 1930s programme for social science 
research, which Adorno and Marcuse allegedly found 
unrealizable.   Does Adorno's "one-man" philosophizing insulate the 
expansion of his programme and guarantee an insularity, contrary to a 
cooperative interdisciplinary programme?  This question is tied to 
the dilemma of the division of intellectual labor.  Jarvis leaves us hanging.

Next topic: the speculative moment.  As I find the earlier 
explication of this idea slightly beyond my reach, I do not 
understand the charges against Adorno as retreating to speculation. I 
don't understand Adorno's characterization of the speculative moment. 
While admitting Adorno's obscurity, Jarvis' explication leaves me in 
the dark. I can understand the refusal both to collapse prescription 
into description as well as to sever them completely.  The rest, 
however, seems needlessly obscure, and I don't get the point. (228) 
It all seems to come down to the meaning of non-identity.  Jarvis is 
at least back on track, but his final defense (if that's what it is) 
of non-identity is too obscure.

There's something missing here.  All this is so wrapped up in the 
mental universe of German idealism.  The roundabout materialism of 
negative dialectics was supposed to get us out of the closed circle 
of self-reflection, yet when Jarvis takes us to the edge, the 
conclusion seems remarkably self-involved.  Something has gone wrong, 
but I can't quite grasp it.