[FRA:] critical theory of religion?

Kenneth MacKendrick kenneth.mackendrick at utoronto.ca
Thu Mar 22 18:16:33 GMT 2007



-----Original Message-----
From: theory-frankfurt-school-bounces at srcf.ucam.org
[mailto:theory-frankfurt-school-bounces at srcf.ucam.org] On Behalf Of Ralph
Dumain
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 1:56 PM
To: theory-frankfurt-school at srcf.ucam.org
Subject: [FRA:] critical theory of religion?

> This article shows up what obscurantist bullshit this whole enterprise
is...

The phrase "critical theory of religion" is contested, ranging from
"religion as critique" to the "critique of religion." Since the FS remained
indebted to theology, mysticism, and religious language as a means of
articulating their critical theory, it stands to reason that both the
critique of religion and the religious critique of society fall within the
range of this phrase. However, there is a diversity of thinkers and a range
of views on this, from public theology (Peukert) and critical theology to a
critical theory of religious thought (Lalonde) to a dialectics of hope
(Hewitt). What is shared here is an interest in the Frankfurt School and
religion... although that means different things to each of us. I take the
phrase to refer to the FSs interest in reconciliation. If I were to address
questions pertaining to this topic I would put them (and have put them) as
follows:

1) What is the epistemological and ethical status of Horkheimer's "longing
for the wholly Other?" For example: Habermas has argued that ultimately
Marcuse's "Great Refusal" rests on theological grounds, which must be
rejected under the conditions of post-metaphysical thought. While he accords
this position an existential dignity, he notes that it is theoretically
incoherent. If this longing is the product of damaged life, may it not then
itself be a thoroughly ideological production, a social pathology?

2) Habermas has time and time again argued that modern thought possesses a
disenchanting dynamic, and has turned since the mid-eighties to religious
thought as a potential means of rejuvenating this emptying out of meaning.
Could it not be the case that Habermas's recent 'sympathies' to religious
thought are themselves distortions brought about by a narrowly conceived
understanding of modernity? If, as Arens maintains, religion is first and
foremost a religious practice, then would it not be that Habermas's refuge
in religious thought as meaningful is a rather serious misunderstanding of
the nature of religion? In other words, to what degree does Habermas
overlook the modernist imagination as itself rejuvenating? Or, is religion
today analogous to the role of art?

3) How does the relentless negativity of critical theory coincide with any
possible vision of reconciliation? Is it possible, or cognitively coherent,
to anticipate utopian transformation and reconciliation solely on the basis
of a negative dialectic? Would it follow from this that any and all
emancipatory projects, or at least those working in the legacy of the
Frankfurt School, are essentially religious movements?

4) Perhaps less a question and more of an observation. It seems to me that
the principal architects of critical theory were using a concept of
"religion" that is quite foreign to us today, especially in North America.
When Horkheimer and Adorno thought about religion, they had in mind Freud's
Totem and Taboo, and the evolutionary development in Tylor and Frazer that
marks the progress of enlightenment from animism through to religion ending
with science.  Today, we no longer view religion in this way, having in mind
a more "comparative" concept. Perhaps we think less of Frazer and more about
Mircea Eliade, Huston Smith, or Wilfred Cantwell Smith. religion in this
sense means "world religions" rather than a mid-way point between myth and
enlightenment. Historicizing the difference has yet to be undertaking (and
is scrupulously avoided by theologians who have vested interest in
maintaining confessional or devotional practices) and may yet lead to
additional complications. I hesitate to suggest that the "critical theory of
religion" might best be replaced by the cumbersome "critical theory of world
religions" - a project that might connect with Hans Kippenberg's history of
religious studies in the modern age and Tomoko Masuzawa's brilliant analysis
of the invention of world religions as a means of perpetuating European
intellectual hegemony in the name of pluralism.

ken





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