[FRA:] H-Net Book Review: The Early Frankfurt School and Religion

[Ralph Dumain]

Thank you. I have not read the book under review, but I will review the 
reviewer nevertheless.  See comments interleaved below.

At 06:56 PM 3/21/2007 -0400, James Rovira wrote:
>H-NET BOOK REVIEW Published by H-German at h-net.msu.edu (January, 2007) 
>Margarete Kohlenbach and Raymond Geuss, eds. _The Early Frankfurt School 
>and Religion_. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. x + 263 pp. Notes, 
>bibliography, index. $85.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-4039-3557-1. Reviewed for 
>H-German by Emily J. Levine, History Department, Stanford University. 
>Dialectics of Enlightenment This volume is the outcome of a growing 
>academic interest in the relationship between religion and Enlightenment 
>broadly conceived. Just as recent works have rewritten religion back into 
>the Enlightenment narrative so, too, this volume reminds us that critical 
>theory was not entirely hostile to religion as was once thought.[1] As 
>Kohlenbach and Geuss explain in their introduction, critical theory was 
>first introduced to the West in the postwar period by the neo-Marxist 
>student movement of the 1960s. Attracted to critical theory because of its 
>claim to link social theory and political practice, the student movement 
>nonetheless simply ignored or suppressed any anti-liberal features of the 
>philosophy that did not fit their own philosophy.

The antiliberal features that immediately come to mind would be:

(a) the FS disregard for the positive aspects of liberalism.

(b) FS disregard --esp. on the part of Marcuse--for the connection between 
positivism and liberalism & leftism.

(c) Romantic tendencies in the FS, though they are clearly not part of the 
Counter-Enlightenment of the Right.

>This attitude extended to any affinities between critical theory and 
>religious traditions. If the Left adopted a secularized form of critical 
>theory for its political purposes, then the theological camp, for its 
>part, exaggerated the existential concerns of critical theory as 
>justification for its own arguments against the privatization of religion 
>and failed to "realise that for Critical Theory religion represented first 
>and foremost a _problem_, even on those rare occasions when it seemed to 
>be presented as a solution" (emphasis in original, p. 2).

Examples would be helpful.  Late Horkheimer is said to harbor religious 
tendencies.  As for theologians, I know they've been interested in Bloch, 
but I'm not knowledgeable enough about their misdeeds with respect to the F.S.


>The outcome of a working conference held at the Centre for 
>Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at the University of Bielefeld in 
>September 2003, this volume of 11 essays re-examines the role of religion 
>in critical theory. The volume follows on the tails of recent historical 
>analysis by Thomas Nipperdey, among others, on the "secularisation and 
>re-sacralisation" of German society in the decades leading up to 1933 (p. 
>3). Because of its members' deep animosity towards the Enlightenment 
>project and, at the same time, their insistence on the implication of 
>religion and myth in the alienation of the liberal subject, not to mention 
>their own assimilated Jewish backgrounds, the Frankfurt School presents a 
>challenge to attempts to reach a coherent view on this subject.

True.

>As Kohlenbach and Geuss argue, "it is within the framework of such a 
>polarity between the social sciences, on the one hand, and spiritually 
>motivated programmes for social change, on the other, that we think the 
>puzzling tension in early Critical Theory between a Marxist critique of, 
>and positive references to, religion can be fruitfully addressed" (p. 4). 
>The excellent introduction is followed by essays grouped rather loosely 
>according to particular historical contexts, conceptual questions or the 
>analysis of texts from different perspectives. In part 1, "Students, 
>Theologians, Critical Theorists," Pascal Eitler discusses the controversy 
>in Germany in the early 1970s over Max Horkheimer's alleged "conversion," 
>which was sparked by an interview published in _Der Spiegel_ on January 5, 
>1970. Raymond Geuss also contributes an essay to this section about 
>changes in the philosophical discussion of religion in the 
>post-Enlightenment period. Despite Howard Caygill's caveat in the volume 
>that work on the relationship between religion and critical theory has 
>remained limited to the works of Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig (p. 
>145), part 2, "Constructions of Religious Experience," focuses exclusively 
>on Walter Benjamin and "just what Benjamin may have meant by 'religion'" 
>(p. 45). Pierfrancesco Fiorato's essay offers a commentary on Benjamin's 
>early religious thought and his critical engagement with the Marburg 
>School. Also in this section, Margarete Kohlenbach compares Benjamin's 
>religious and political thought with the reconstruction of religious 
>experience in Jewish philosopher Erich Unger's philosophy of religion. 
>Finally, Barnaba Maj interprets Benjamin's idea of allegory as a 
>methodological and rhetorical response to the religious theme in 
>Expressionist art against the backdrop of the destruction of the First 
>World War. The third section, "Legal Philosophy and Jewish Tradition," is 
>the strongest of the book's divisions, adding valuable insights and 
>perspectives to this important topic. Here Chris Thornhill reconstructs 
>common themes in the legal philosophy of the early Frankfurt School and 
>its critique of liberalism in the context of contemporary thinkers such as 
>Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger. The section also includes essays by 
>both David Groiser and Howard Caygill, who focus in different ways on the 
>relevance of critical theory to the so-called Jewish Renaissance of Weimar 
>culture.

Erich Fromm must be somewhere in all this.

>Thornhill argues that critical theory's critique of Enlightenment was 
>necessarily wed to a critique of modern legal theory because of the way 
>that modern rationality supplanted all natural and metaphysical law with 
>its own regulating system. Thornhill does an excellent job of summarizing 
>the paradoxical relationship of religion to critical theory, which is 
>revealed by his critique of the modern legal subject: "[T]he first 
>Enlightenment argued against metaphysics and religion because these 
>defined human authority and validity through reference to an imputed 
>categorical order of creation. The Enlightenment then took for itself the 
>task of cementing its own rational legal fabric at the heart of the 
>humanized universe. The different Enlightenment proposed by thinkers 
>linked to early Critical Theory argues, however, that metaphysical and 
>religious contents, dialectically construed, are now vitally required in 
>order to free human life from the autonomous juridical structures which it 
>has entered in its miscarried attempt at secularisation and temporal 
>emancipation" (p. 127). In other words, Enlightenment rid itself of 
>religion in order to be free and critical theory, in turn, must utilize 
>religion once again to rectify the unfreedom of Enlightenment.

This is a dangerous path to tread, esp. since the religious revival is 
intimately linked to fascism and anto-Semitism.  But more generally, I 
think it's bullshit.  This was before the '60s counterculture, which I 
imagine would yield a different spin on the problem.  Oddly, in English, 
there seems to be almost total silence about the counterculture and its 
connection to New Age thought.  What am I missing?

>Because of his success in placing the questions of religion in the context 
>of a broader debate on legality in the 1920s, Thornhill's essay also 
>illustrates explicitly what is latent in some of the other essays: the 
>varying political tendencies of the re-sacralization of critique of the 
>Enlightenment and the modern legal subject. That the philosophies of 
>modernity could culminate in politics either of the Right or Left is an 
>argument one finds in many works of European cultural and intellectual 
>history of this period.[2]

Something I/we need to know more about.

>  Thornhill's summary of the legal critiques of thinkers as politically 
> diverse as Georg Lukács and Heidegger make this point clear. "Underlying 
> all these perspectives is the claim that modern liberal law has abandoned 
> all living content, and merely stratifies itself antinomically--as a 
> formal system of regulation--against the temporal, vital and 
> associational aspects of human existence and experience" (p. 112).

Which of course could be a fascist, anarchist, New Left or countercultural 
critique.

>David Grosier's essay in the same section dovetails nicely with 
>Thornhill's, illustrating that this paradox of Enlightenment plays itself 
>out in the parallel development of religion itself, insofar as religion 
>becomes wedded to the ideology of Enlightenment and emancipation in the 
>modern period. Just as Kant seemed to offer freedom from any naturally or 
>metaphysically revealed order by turning modern rationality into its own 
>law, so, too, Moses Mendelssohn and William von Humboldt had freedom of 
>religion in mind when they resisted the right of the state to dictate 
>belief. The irony is that both developments produced a "mixture of formal 
>liberalism and substantial dogmatism" that left the individual anything 
>but free in the eyes of critical theorists (p. 131).

What exactly does this last sentence mean? What is the postulated linkage 
between formal liberalism and substantial dogmatism?  Was the former the 
cover for the latter? Is there a causal linkage between the two?  An 
unintended consequence? The latter in spite of the former?

>That critical theory was slightly more susceptible to religious 
>alternatives because of its deep animosity for the so-called first 
>Enlightenment is a subtle irony mentioned by Geuss but surprisingly not 
>commented upon by other contributors.

What religious alternatives? Why is this alleged irony overlooked by 
others?  Same animosity?

>In fact, Geuss argues that if the three main features of critical theory 
>are that it "(1) maintains a firm grip on liberal taboos about the human 
>subject, (2) it is committed to the continued cultivation of the 
>metaphysical need, and (3) it exhibits a paralysing fear of instrumental 
>reason," then, "in all three of these respects it shows itself to be very 
>similar to well-known properties of archaic religions" (p. 40).

However, the critical theorists were not Rightists or mystics.

>In the final section, "Dialectic of Enlightenment Reconsidered," the 
>dialectics of Enlightenment and religion are addressed in the texts that 
>deal explicitly with the topic. Rüdiger Bittner argues that while Theodor 
>Adorno and Horkheimer lay claim to a dialectically structured argument, 
>they in fact present not the dialectics of Enlightenment, but rather the 
>failure of a historical development. Moreover, Bittner contends that their 
>critique of instrumental rationality rests on religious assumptions. For 
>Bittner, the irony of the _Dialectic of Enlightenment_ (1947) is that 
>their critique of Western civilization is in fact a religious critique and 
>the dialectic is that "without [religion's] support the book will go 
>nowhere" (p. 170).

Religious assumptions?  Which? D of E goes nowhere because it is a purely 
ideological critique of ideology, with or without religion.  I don't 
believe Bittner.

>Gérard Raulet's essay on Ernst Cassirer and Adorno is equally commendable 
>for the way that it reveals a different aspect of the argument on 
>religion. First, Roulet argues that Horkheimer's second thesis that myth 
>is already Enlightenment falls within the Enlightenment tradition. This 
>point is made clearer by Roulet's clever comparison of _Dialectic of 
>Enlightenment_ with expressions of the Enlightenment motif in Cassirer's 
>_Philosophy of Symbolic Forms_ (Vol. I, 1923; Vol. II, 1925; Vol. III, 
>1929). Horkheimer and Adorno's radical use of Cassirer's philosophy of 
>symbolic forms highlights the "dual conception of the remembrance of 
>nature within the subject" leading to the subjection of women and Jews for 
>they remind the subject of the uncontrollable aspects of nature. According 
>to Kohlenbach and Geuss, Roulet reveals that "[I]n other words, _Dialectic 
>of Enlightenment_ is still--to some extent, and dialectically--an 
>Enlightenment project" (pp. 11-12).

I thought everyone agreed on this last point.

>  The dilemma of whether the _Dialectic of Enlightenment_ is a diatribe 
> against the Enlightenment, an Enlightenment critique of myth or a 
> religious critique of technical rationality is not resolved in these 
> pages. Rather, as in many conference proceedings, the contributors raise 
> interesting questions that leave room for future research.

I would say that all of these assertions are wrongly formulated.

>That there is little to no positive mention of the theme of religion in 
>the works of members of the Frankfurt School presented an additional 
>challenge to this volume and is reflected in its creative and myriad 
>hermeneutical approaches to the topic.

I wonder how much BS there is in this book.  Perhaps the F.S. is being used 
improperly for the cause of religious restoration?

>The result is a thought-provoking volume. Notes [1]. For recent works on 
>religion and Enlightenment see, for example, S.J. Barnett, _Enlightenment 
>and Religion: The Myths of Modernity (Manchester: Manchester University 
>Press, 2003); Robert Devigne, _J.S. Mill's use of Ancient, Religious, 
>Liberal and Romantic Moralities_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); 
>David L. Holmes, _The Faiths of the Founding Fathers_ (Oxford: Oxford 
>University Press, 2006); and Ole P. Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., 
>_Medicine and Religion in Enlightenment Europe_ (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
>2007). [2]. In addition to Carl Schorske's classic _Fin de Siècle Vienna: 
>Politics and Culture_ (New York: Random House, 1980), see, for example, 
>Kevin Repp, _Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: 
>Anti-politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890-1914_ (Cambridge: 
>Harvard University Press, 2000).

Interesting references.