[FRA:] Dubiel, Helmut. Theory and Politics (1)
Doug Kellner
kellner at ucla.edu
Tue Feb 28 18:38:31 GMT 2006
Here's my review from mid-80s when the Dubiel book first came out=
b:dubiel.rev
Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics. Studies in the Development of Critical
Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1985), xiii and
207 pages; translated by Benjamin Gregg.
Benjamin Gregg's translation of Helmut Dubiel's 1978 book
Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung: Studien zur fruhen
Kritischen Theorie) makes accessible to English-speaking readers one of
the most important books yet to appear on the theory and politics of the
so-called Frankfurt school. Dubiel provides the best available historical
and analytical account of the development of critical theory, of its method
of interdisciplinary social research, and of how it organized and pursued
its research projects during its years under Horkheimer's directorship in
Weimar Germany and in exile in the United States during the era of fascism.
In the first half of his book, Dubiel focuses on "political experience and
the process of theory construction in the Frankfurt circle, 1930-1945." His
study shows that, at least during this period, the Institute for Social
Research was extremely interested in history, politics, and the relation of
its work to its historical situation and revolutionary politics. The texts,
correspondence, and other material cited provides a strong defense against
criticisms that critical theory is primarily apolitical, uninterested in
history and politics, idealistic, and hostile to science. Dubiel's research
makes it clear that the critical theorists took different positions during
varying historical periods toward their socio-historical situation,
politics, science, and theory.
Dubiel divides the work of the Institute for Social Research during the
period under scrutiny into three distinct stages: 1) materialism, 1930-1937;
2) critical theory, 1937-1940; 3) the critique of instrumental reason,
1940-1945. He differentiates these stages according to the general
theoretical position maintained, the political position and presentation of
the theory-practice relation, and their specific historical experience and
positions toward the working class movement, fascism, and the Soviet Union
during the period under question. Dubiel thus contributes both to a better
understanding of the genesis of critical theory and to its developments
under specific politico-historical and theoretical exigencies. In
characterizing the theory-praxis relation he distinguishes between the
varying subjects and addressees of the theory and their differing
conceptions of the relation between theory and practice in various
historical contexts. In particular, he shows how critical theory began by
addressing itself to a revolutionary proletariat as part of the
revolutionary movement and ended by addressing primarily other radical
intellectuals in political isolation.
In characterizing the dominant theoretical position during each stage,
Dubiel analyzes the specific "self-understanding within the tradition of
historical and political theory," the relation to Marxism, the relation of
philosophy to science, and the concept of utopia operative. This sort of
careful, differentiated historical and theoretical analysis makes possible
appreciation of the heterogeneity of critical theory during its "heroic," or
"classical," period and the significant developments within critical theory
that have been generally overlooked by most historians or followers of
critical theory, especially within the English-speaking world. Theory and
Politics thus provides an indispensible source for understanding both the
history of critical theory and its fundamental theoretical position(s).
Dubiel argues that the, first, "materialism" phase of critical theory is
distinguished by commitment to a materialist social theory defined by the
unity of philosophy and science (11-38) and rooted in the marxian critique
of political economy. The distinctive contribution of this stage was
development of a marxian social psychology and the major research project
was a study of the social-psychological structure of employees in the Weimar
Republic--which was recently published for the first time as @U(Arbeiter und
Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches) (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags
Anstalt, 1980) and was translated as The Working Class in Weimar Germany
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984)). Politically, there was
"critical solidarity with the 'revolutionary wing of the working-class
movement'" which characterized the political orientation of the group (17).
Eschewing both the mechanistic metaphysical materialism already
criticized by Marx in The Holy Family, as well as the current positivistic
forms of materialism, Horkheimer and his colleagues defined the objects of
materialist theory in terms of existing social struggles, problems, and
experiences. Rejecting Hegel's identity theory (and thus the forms of
epistemological realism held to by many positivistic materialists then and
now), for the critical theorists there was a non-identity between concept
and object; their concepts and theories thus provided but pictures of the
socio-material world and not any absolute or indubitable knowledge. As
Horkheimer wrote, "'Materialist theory...is not a metaphysics of history but
a picture of the world that changes and develops in the context of practical
efforts to improve it'" (33).
The materialist theory of society developed by Horkheimer and his colleagues
was closely related to Marxism at this stage: "'Materialism is characterized
by its content: the economic theory of society'" (34). During this stage,
the Institute saw its purpose as reformulating Marxian theory "under the
historically changed conditions of capitalism and the labor movement" (34).
This involved moving beyond crude marxian conceptions of the relation
between base and superstructure and developing both a marxist social
psychology and cultural theory to better analyze the mediations between the
economic base and the realms of the superstructure.
The Institute's social theory during this phase was a response both to
inadequacies within classical Marxism and the dominant forms of bourgeois
science. Orthodox Marxism had congealed into a dogmatic, reductionist,
objectivistic metaphysical materialism, and bourgeois social science was
characterized by a fragmentation of the sciences, each cut off from the
other and pursuing its investigations isolated from other disciplines. To
overcome this dual crisis of Marxism and bourgeois science, the Institute
attempted to develop an "interdisciplinary materialism" that would be
characterized by an integration of philosophy and science. Accordingly,
during the 1930s the Institute developed criticisms of both the abstract,
speculative and metaphysical philosophy dominant in Germany at the time and
the various specialized sciences. Thus, the project of constructing an
interdisciplinary "materialist superscience" was conceived in opposition to
both the specialized bourgeois sciences and the socialist scientism of many
orthodox social democrats like Kautsky or communists like Stalin. As
Horkheimer stated at the time:
"'Materialism requires the unification of philosophy and science. Of course,
it recognizes technical differences between the more general research of
philosophy and the more specialized research in the sciences, just as it
recognizes differences in method between research and presentation but not
between science and philosophy as such'" (36).
And in his inaugural address after taking over as Director of
the Institute, Horkheimer argued:
"'What matters today... is to organize investigations on the basis of
current philosophical problems that unite philosophers, sociologists,
economists, historians, and psychologists in an ongoing research community
that can do together what in other disciplines one individual alone does in
the laboratory, what genuine scientists have always done: pursue those
questions aimed at the view of the whole, using the most refined scientific
methods; reformulate the questions in the course of work as demanded by the
object; make more precise and develop new methods without losing sight of
general considerations'" (36).
During its "interdisciplinary materialism" stage, the Institute members saw
themselves as part of the revolutionary labor movement, and supported
efforts for a planned economy and the construction of socialism in the
Soviet Union; they also saw fascism, in rather orthodox marxian terms, as
the product of capitalism in crisis. Dubiel's study is especially valuable
for the way that it assembles materials defining both the Institute's
theoretical and political positions at different stages of development, and
how its members conceived the relation between theory and politics at
different junctues. Dubiel's assembled quotations are extremely well-chosen
and illuminating and provide a useful compendium of Institute positions on
both theory and politics. In particular, he shows that, contrary to some
misimpressions, the Institute took rather systematic and well-defined
positions toward the political issues and movements of the day--at least
until the 1940s.
During what Dubiel sees as the Insitute's second stage, they explicitly
adopted the term "critical theory" to characterize their work. This stage
(1937-1940) is marked by the defeat of the labor movement in Germany, the
triumph of fascism, and increasing doubts about the Soviet Union as
revelations of its trials, labor camps, and stalinist deformations became
wide-spread. This historical situation required new reflections on the
relation between politics and theory, the role of the radical intellectual,
and the nature of socialism. In essays published during this stage both
Horkheimer and Marcuse "expressly emphasize that a change in property
relations implies merely a negative precondition for the building of a
socialist society" (42). As Marcuse put it: "'Without freedom and happiness
in the social relations of human beings, even the greatest increase in
production, even the abolition of private property in the means of
production, remains infected with the old injustices'" (42).
At this time, the Institute adopted the term "critical theory" to define
their theoretical position in part because conditions of exile in the United
States forced them to adopt code words to describe their project to cover
over their commitments to Marxism in an environment that was quite hostile
to Marxism. The label stuck and many of its inner circle utilized it to
define themselves to the present, and the Institute's theoretical labors as
a whole are frequently subsumed under the blanket concept of "critical
theory," though as Dubiel shows, this term was first coined in 1937 and
henceforth was used to cover work in different contexts that was often quite
different.
Theory and Politics documents the conditions and texts whereby the Institute
developed a radical, neo-Marxian social theory more appropriate to a
situation when radical intellectuals are segregated, isolated, and
marginalized. Dubiel derives the title of the first section of his study
from this situation: "the integration of the proletariat and the loneliness
of the intelligentsia." Critical theory represents a stage in the
development of neo-marxist social theories during which radical
intellectuals were separated from revolutionary socialist movements and
fascism steadily gained power throughout the world. The Institute theorists
were among the first to characterize this situation and to make explicit the
problems for the marxian theory of revolution when the working class was
defeated or integrated into capitalist societies. This, of course, remains
one of the defining features of the trajectory of critical theory to this
day and points to why the Institute felt it was necessary to update and
revise both the marxian theory and critique of capitalism, as well as the
marxian theory of revolution and the transition from capitalism to
socialism.
Thus, as Dubiel puts it, "By 1937, the subject and addressee of
revolutionary theory are separated much more clearly in the Frankfurt
Circle's political self-interpretation. Horkheimer maintains repeatedly
that, for the sake of the adequacy of the theory, the critical intellectual
must be able to endure marginalization from the addressee of his theoretical
work" (53). During this period, Horkheimer and his colleagues radicalized
and developed their critiques of what they called "traditional theory" and
further developed their theoretical position. The political impasse
evidently inspired more sustained theoretical labors. The critical
theorists still advocated a synthesis of philosophy and the sciences (63)
but seemed more open to various empirical sciences and more critical of
classical marxism. During the 1930s and early 40s, the critical theorists
continued their work in developing interdisciplinary social theory and
intensified efforts to develop a theory of fascism--projects that I shall
shortly return to as they are the subject of the second half of Dubiel's
book.
But probably the most significant development in the trajectory of the
Institute's development was abandonment of the project of interdisciplinary
social theory for production of the critique of instrumental reason which
found classical expression in Adorno's and Horkheimer's @U(Dialectic of
Enlightenment) (1947). Although Dubiel describes the continued demise of
the labor movement, spread of fascism, and oppressive developments in the
Soviet Union at this time, he does not adequately explicate the conditions
which led to the rather dramatic departures from their earlier theoretical
enterprises. While Dubiel notes the impact of WW II (76) on the
development of critical theory, he does not analyze in any detail the
breaking up of the Institute's interdisciplinary group; this happened in
part because Horkheimer was forced to go to California on account of his
health and because many of the Institute inner circle and other colleagues
joined the U.S. government as part of their struggle against fascism. At
this time, Adorno and Horkheimer took over the development of critical
theory and this stage is particularly marked by the imprint of Adorno's
particular ideas and style of writing--a point not adequately explicated by
Dubiel who tends to present Horkheimer as the demiurge of critical theory.
Adorno's and Horkheimer's work during this period is addressed to "critical
intellectuals" and the pretense that they were writing for a temporarily
defeated revolutionary movement is surrendered. Likewise, the attempt to
integrate philosophy and the social sciences is replaced by more aggressive
philosophical theorizing and speculation. Given that both Adorno and
Horkheimer were trained as philosophers, and in the absence of the
interdisciplinary research Institute, it is not surprising that critical
theory would turn more philosophical and radicalize its critique of science.
This development was also conditioned by the instrumentalization of science
and technology in the Nazi and other war machines and by Adorno's and
Horkheimer's growing aversion to the sort of scientific philosophy and
positivistic science dominant in the United States. Consequently, the
critique of instrumental reason and the "dialectic of enlightenment"
replaced the earlier marxian emphasis on class struggle and materialist
social analysis with a focus on the primacy of the relation between humans
and nature, in which marxism, enlightenment rationality, science and
technology, the culture industries, and the trends of development of both
capitalist and socialist societies were interpreted under the rubric of the
"dialectic of enlightenment." In this theory, projects like Marxism and
science, intended to contribute to the domination of nature, turned into
more powerful instruments for the domination of human beings.
On a theoretical and political level, Dubiel provides a fine analysis of the
changed political and theoretical position developed by Adorno and
Horkheimer during this period (67-97). Again, he chooses key passages to
express their political isolation, their pessimistic conclusion that
henceforth political radicalism could only survive in select critical
intellectuals, and their more apocalyptic and elusive style of writing.
Dubiel makes clear, against some of the devotees of critical theory, that
important discontinuities emerged within the trajectory of critical theory
and that the most significant discontinuities emerged in the 1940s in the
break between this stage and the two earlier stages of development.
I would, however, take issue with some of Dubiel's conclusions stated in
summary form after his historical, political, and theoretical analysis of
the key stages of development within the Institute. He claims that "The
labor movement's demise at the end of the Weimar Republic was the most
significant experience undergone by the Circle" (99). This judgement is
somewhat misleading, and I would argue instead that the experiences of
fascism and emigration were the crucial determinants of key features of
critical theory. The inner circle of the Institute was never particularly
interested in the vicissitudes of the labor movement and, in any case, the
triumph of fascism was the key factor in the demise (or rather defeat) of
the labor movement at the end of Weimar. Moreover, none of the historians
of the Frankfurt school, I believe, have adequately analyzed the impact and
conditions of emigration on Institute work and positions. Critical theory
bears typical marks of radical emigrant thought in that it is especially
critical, impassioned, and contains novel insights into both the culture and
society from which it fled and into the culture to which it has emigrated,
along with corresponding blindspots in both directions. But it is also
marked by increasing isolation from a revolutionary movement or political
struggles to which it can relate. Thus, against Dubiel, I would argue that
it was the rise and triumph of fascism and the subsequent situation of exile
which increasingly influenced the style, mode of presentation, focus, and
substance of critical theory which became more apocalyptic, dramatic,
ultra-radical, increasingly cut off from practical politics, and
individualistic.
To be fair to Dubiel, it should be noted that his interest is not to provide
a detailed historical analysis of the facts and factors behind the
Institute's development of critical theory, but rather to provide analysis
of the conditions, structure, and organization of the Institute's
interdisciplinary program of social research. This project, mentioned in
the Introduction, becomes the focus of the second part of his book (119).
Here Dubiel provides often fascinating insights into how the Institute
actually worked and interesting analyses of the general structure and
organization of interdisciplinary social science. This section should
therefore be of interest both to those interested in the history and modus
operandi of the Institute for Social Research and to those interested in how
interdisciplinary research might be organized.
Dubiel admits that in his research into how the Institute actually organized
its investigations and publication projects several members contested the
key role which he and others ascribed to Max Horkheimer (a point also
contested by Herbert Marcuse in an interview with Jurgen Habermas in
@U(Telos) 38), and Dubiel admits that his interpretation of Horkheimer's
role is "somewhat forced." However, I would suggest that the concept of the
"dictatorship of the Director," which Horkheimer openly proclaimed and which
Dubiel makes a defining characteristic of Institute work, is more
problematic than Dubiel indicates. Whereas Horkheimer may or may not have
played the key organizational and theoretical role in both the development
and presentation of critical theory, I would think that if the utopia of the
Institute for Social Research were reinvented that a more democratic and
less "dictatorial" structure might be preferable.
In fact, as with most German and American followers of critical theory,
there are precious few critiques of Horkheimer or critical theory in
Dubiel's book. During the last couple of pages, Dubiel remarks that
Horkheimer had a rather "naive concept of the empirical" and did not
adequately perceive how "theoretical initiatives in the specialized sciences
no longer came--and for some time had not come--from philosophy but rather
from the various disciplines themselves; and that philosophy which stood in
close relationship to the specialized sciences, had disintegrated into a
loose ensemble of 'hyphenated' philosophies" (186). But I would argue that
the role of philosophy within social theory during the materialism and
critical theory stages was neither obtrusive or excessive and that during
these periods the Institute achieved a rather nice balance between
theoretical construction and empirical research and that their training in
and use of philosophy played a generally constructive role.
The problem with the trajectory of critical theory, as I see it, is that
with the breaking up of the interdisciplinary Institute during WW II, and
with Adorno and Horkheimer's transformation of critical theory from an
interdisciplinary theory of society to a philosophy of history, critical
theory, at least temporarily, cut itself off from both the sciences and
political struggle and developments. Consequently, the critical theory
developed by Adorno and Horkheimer in the 1940s and 50s became more
hermetic, literary and philosophical. But even this stage of critical theory
contains many valuable texts and insights, and I would suggest that what
Dubiel described as the first two stages of critical theory still provides
models of an interdisciplinary social theory with practical intent that
continues to be relevant today. The different sort of radical philosophical
discourse developed by Adorno and Horkheimer during the 1940s--and more or
less practiced by them in most of their later work despite attempts to
resurrect the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt during the
1950s--has its own special virtues and attractions but seems to me quite
different from the project of uniting philosophy and the sciences which
characterized critical theory in the 1930s (and which also characterizes the
last decade or so of Jurgen Habermas' attempts to reestablish critical
theory as a viable contemporary social theory). Thus I believe that one of
the contributions of Dubiel's book is that he shows that critical theory
contains various projects, texts, and models which might be employed for
varying purposes in diverse historical circumstances.
Moreover, I believe that Dubiel's book is of more than historical interest
in that it shows how interdisciplinary work might be organized and shows how
fruitful syntheses between philosophy, social science, cultural critique,
and radical politics might take place. One of the enduring legacies of
critical theory is therefore illuminated by Dubiel's study: development of
an interdisciplinary radical social theory with practical intent. Whether
this project remains a nostalgic utopia of a bygone era or a viable model
for future work is one of the major questions posed by Dubiel's interesting
and challenging study.
@
Douglas Kellner
Philosophy of Education Chair
Social Sciences and Comparative Education
University of California-Los Angeles
Box 951521, 3022B Moore Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1521
Fax 310 206 6293
Phone 310 825 0977
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ralph Dumain" <rdumain at igc.org>
To: <theory-frankfurt-school at srcf.ucam.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 9:56 AM
Subject: [FRA:] Dubiel, Helmut. Theory and Politics (1)
> Got this book yesterday--a fascinating approach to the program of the
> Institute for Social Research:
>
> Dubiel, Helmut. Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of
> Critical Theory, translated by Benjamin Gregg, with an introduction by
> Martin Jay. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.
>
> Contents
>
> introduction by Martin Jay ix
>
> I. The Integration of the Proletariat and the Loneliness of the
> Intelligentsia: Political Experience and the Process of Theory
> Construction in the Frankfurt Circle, 1930-1945
>
> Methodological Procedure 3
>
> The First Phase: Materialism, 1930-1937 11
> Historical and Political Experience 11
> Theory of the Theory-Praxis Relation 23
> Theoretical Position 31
>
> The Second Phase: Critical Theory, 1937-1940 39
> Historical and Political Experience 39
> Theory of the Theory-Praxis Relation 49
> Theoretical Position 57
>
> The Third Phase: The Critique of Instrumental Reason, 1940-1945 69
> Historical and Political Experience 69
> Theory of the Theory-Praxis Relation 81
> Theoretical Position 88
>
> Summary 99
> Historical and Political Experience 99
> Theory of the Theory-Praxis Relation 100
> Theoretical Position 103
>
> Structural Change in Political and Historical Experience 109
>
> Notes to Part 1 113
>
>
> II. Dialectical Presentation and Interdisciplinary Research: Theory
> Construction and Research Organization in the Institute for Social
> Research after 1930
>
> Introduction: On the Methodology of Interdisciplinary 119
> Research
>
> The Program of the Institute for Social Research 129
>
> The Program in the Context of the History of Science 133
> The Philosophical Critique of Science and the Neopositivist
> Critique of Philosophy in the Weimar Republic 133
> The Relation of Theory to Empirical Research in Contemporary
> Sociology 136
>
> Theoretical and Historical Background 141
>
> The Theory of Dialectical Presentation and Research Organization
> 151
>
> The Cognitive Structure of the Organization of Research 155
> The Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung 156
>
> Studies on Authority and the Family 164
> Analysis of the Circle's Cognitive Structure 168
>
> The Social Structure of the Organization of Research 173
> The Circle's Structure of Communication 173
> Role Differentiation within the Circle 177
> Conditions Determining the Institutional Framework 180
>
> Summary 183
>
> Notes to Part II 189
>
> Bibliography 191
>
> Index 205
>
> ------------------
>
> The methodological prelude includes a discussion of the conditions of a
> group's--in this case the Frankfurt School's--endeavors in the way of
> theoretical self-consciousness (reflection). Dubiel explains his approach
> to the subject matter, e.g.:
>
> ---begin quote---
> Our systematic representation of the early Frankfurt Circle is based on
> the following structure of points in inquiry:
>
> Historical and political experience
> The labor movement
> The Soviet Union
> Fascism
>
> Theory of the theory-praxis relation
> Subject and addressee
> Theory and praxis
>
> Theoretical Position
> Self-understanding within the tradition of historical and
> political theory
> Relation to Marxism
> Relation of philosophy to science
> Utopia
> ---end quote---
>
> Dubiel's review of the Frankfurt School's self-understanding involves its
> assessment of contemporary conditions. For example, in the first phase
> we see Horkheimer's critical assessment of the German Communist Party
> (KPD) in relation to its Stalinization and hence developments in the USSR,
> and an even more critical commentary on the Social Democrats (SPD).
>
>
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