Body as condition of knowledge

[j laari]

Greetings

No, it's not obvious. You're right. But remembering that has been one
of the central features of modern philosophy since neokantian wave.

> Is that obvious? Language and meaning could be the second
> ontological dimension besides physical reality. If one operates
> with entities of this ontological category (eg. concepts,
> meanings, words, propositions) then the physical reality seems to
> fade into the background.

Secondly, I'd be careful not to collapse that all (language and words
and propositions, concepts, and meanings) into one big "mill", so to
speak.

Think about alternative according to that conceptuality is one process
- perhaps the thinking process proper - and then we just try to
express the concepts and thoughts linguistically. It sort of muddles
the things first but later it's different. After linguistic turn there
has been certain trend to collapse thoughts and sign systems (that we
use to express the former) into one. In human sciences culturalism,
understood as study of signification (as it has been "defined" in
cultural studies recently), has strengthened the trend. Quite
unfortunate.

> I was trying to stress that the bodily aspect could be fundamental
> to all human consciousness, not only to a high-level complex like
> knowledge.

Yes.

> Meaning and understanding seem more fundamental than knowledge:

Yes.

> Where I sense a difference is my Pragmatist or Practicist
> orientation. A phenomenologist analyses experience, for example
> how spatiality is a necessary feature in human orientation in the
> world, an ingredient in concept formation etc.

OK, we just ought to remember that we shouldn't take that difference
of viewpoints as an opposition of contradicting doctrines (or
whatever). In many ways it's fruitful to see them as complementary. At
least I tend to forget that every now and then.

> I see the human world view as a "framework of action": a hierarchy
> of prescriptions which eventually stipulate our bodily action.
> Knowledge is a secondary concept (...) At a lower level there is
> different kinds of complex (...), to which I refer with concepts
> such as meaning and understanding. I don't think these are
> essentially propositional in nature.

OK.

> Another vision is connected with the concept of "tacit knowledge"
> (...) Nonaka and Takeuchi even stress that this knowledge is not
> intellectual but has some kind of a connection to bodily activity.
> I think tacit knowledge is often procedural, not propositional.

Yes, that's how it also has been characterised. Tacit knowledge has
also been a theme in the sociology of knowledge in the last few
decades. You might wan't to take a look at those discussions, too.

> I am not familiar with Routila, and I fail to see how this is
> connected to the body - can you please fill in?

You're interested in the theme 'body and knowledge'. In one sense that
is one of the central themes of phenomenology (though not always
explicit one). Now, Routila as one of the central figures (in Finland)
in discussions related to such themes might provide you with some
easily accessible texts. Originally the central texts usually are in
German and translations could be difficult to find. That's why I
mentioned Routila. For him there's probably no problems whatsoever to
say that "Dasein" (my 'being in the world') is or means basically
one(self) being a corporeal living being that has a practical relation
to the world, and that all our ideas, conceptions, ideologies and
knowledges stem from that.

Sincerely, Jukka L