Body as condition of knowledge (was: Lebensphilosophie)

[Risto S Varanka]

Sorry for the late response, but hopefully this clears things up... 

----- Forwarded message from j laari -----
>It's quite difficult to think of, say, thinking, meaningfulness and
>sense without realising and remembering the role and significance of
>the body.

Is that obvious? Language and meaning could be the second
ontological dimension besides physical reality. If one operates
with entities of this ontological category (eg. concepts,
meanings, words, propositions) then the physical reality seems to
fade into the background.

>you sometime later.) Basically, one could say that it's all about
>trying to make of sense of what it is to be a corporeal being. Marx
>expressed it quite beautifully in thesis on Feuerbach.

I'd think some thinkers influenced by Marx could be good reading
when one is trying to develop some kind of a praxis theory - a
view on practical human action (eg. work) and how that is relevant
for knowledge. Too bad I'm not very detailed on Marxist
philosophers :-. 

>> I'm also trying research what kind of a role the human body has
>> for knowledge. (...) I think many Phenomenologists - from
>> Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus - emphasize that the
>> experienced human body is a necessary precondition of knowledge,
>> while I tend to think that the connection to bodily action is a
>> necessary precondition of meaning and understanding.
>
>However, would you clarify the difference between you and phenom.
>tradition? (E.g. can't it be both ways; precondition both of knowledge
>and understanding & meaning?)

Maybe I am in agreement with the Phenomenological tradition, I
just lack knowledge on these writers :-) I was trying to stress
that the bodily aspect could be fundamental to all human
consciousness, not only to a high-level complex like knowledge.
Meaning and understanding seem more fundamental than knowledge:
for example if you think of knowledge as propositions, you can
think of understanding as something that makes the constituents of
propositions meaningful, so that humans are capable of applying
the contents of propositions.

Where I sense a difference is my Pragmatist or Practicist
orientation. A phenomenologist analyses experience, for example
how spatiality is a necessary feature in human orientation in the
world, an ingredient in concept formation etc. My view is in a way
reverse - from consciousness to physical reality. In my view our
knowledge and understanding forms a system that directs our
action. Humans certainly experience the colour and spatial
extension of bananas, and form conceptions about long yellow
fruit. However, the really interesting thing is how humans can
leverage these conceptions to get bananas whenever they need them
- in other words, practical effectiveness.

Getting bananas is in many ways obviously a physical activity, so
here we get the thesis that any concept about bananas is
meaningful only if it can produce practical prescriptions - ie.
that we are to physically behave in a way A rather than B if we
want to get the banana (or to achieve some other practical effect
with a banana).

>> I am slightly dissatisfied with a Habermasian view of knowledge,
>> which views knowledge as propositional content, the validity of
>> which is determined in a discourse removed from action. (...) I'm
>> starting to think that maybe it's possible to dig up some passages
>> from Habermas which give a role to the human body in the formation
>> of knowledge.
>
>So you mean by 'knowledge' something else than a proposition that is
>true?

I see the human world view as a "framework of action": a hierarchy
of prescriptions which eventually stipulate our bodily action. 
Knowledge is a secondary concept which we also can use to analyze
this framework.  At a lower level there is different kinds of
complex and "soft" stuff going on, to which I refer with concepts
such as meaning and understanding.  I don't think these are
essentially propositional in nature. 

Another vision is connected with the concept of "tacit knowledge",
which has become quite popular within the field of knowledge
management. The idea is that competent workers in an organization
often have very valuable knowledge which can be hard to articulate
(eg. how to make bread that tastes good) and some writers such as
Nonaka and Takeuchi even stress that this knowledge is not
intellectual but has some kind of a connection to bodily activity.
I think tacit knowledge is often procedural, not propositional.

>By the way, have you checked what Lauri Routila has said on
>these issues? I'm asking this because he critisized Habermas' interest
>theory of knowledge from phenomenological standpoint (by asking e.g.
>where H. left the theoretical interest; on what interest H's theory
>is based except on theoretical one etc. - here the relation of the
>question of knowledge to that of body can be easily opened).

I am not familiar with Routila, and I fail to see how this is
connected to the body - can you please fill in?

I have viewed a notion of a "theoretical interest" mostly as an
attempt from Scientific Realism to water down the theory of
Habermas. I'd like to emphasize that scientific knowledge is
necessarily connected to practical action somehow, while a notion
of a theoretical interest seems to mean that it's just natural for
science and knowledge to be detached from the praxis.

>Sincerely, Jukka L

Yours,
-- 
Risto Varanka | http://www.helsinki.fi/~rvaranka/
risto varanka at no spam please helsinki fi