Body as condition of knowledge (was: Lebensphilosophie)

[j laari]

Greetings!

I guess it is so. However, Habermas is quite straightforward
naturalist and therefore he misses the transcendental-philosophical
dimension of Lebenswelt. I.e. for him 'Lebenswelt' is simply that
'empirical', or perhaps 'phenomenal', social action of the humans. But
then again, I'm not a Habermas expert.

> Is this perhaps reflected in Habermas's notion of the lifeworld,
> which is in danger of being "colonized by the system"?

Despite being theoretically at odds with transcendental phenomenology,
Habermas' conception of Lebenswelt as sociological theory probably
really can be seen reflecting (in rather peculiar ways) Husserl's (and
perhaps Simmel's) views.

It's quite difficult to think of, say, thinking, meaningfulness and
sense without realising and remembering the role and significance of
the body. I think the major contribution of 20th century philosophy
has been in clarifying problems that rise from this awareness of us
being living, self-consciouss beings. (There are some interesting
anecdotes concerning the beginnings of these developments at the turn
of the century, but I won't waste bandwidth now. I may pass them to
you sometime later.) Basically, one could say that it's all about
trying to make of sense of what it is to be a corporeal being. Marx
expressed it quite beautifully in thesis on Feuerbach.

> I'm also trying research what kind of a role the human body has
> for knowledge. (...) I think many Phenomenologists - from
> Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus - emphasize that the
> experienced human body is a necessary precondition of knowledge,
> while I tend to think that the connection to bodily action is a
> necessary precondition of meaning and understanding.

However, would you clarify the difference between you and phenom.
tradition? (E.g. can't it be both ways; precondition both of knowledge
and understanding & meaning?)

> I am slightly dissatisfied with a Habermasian view of knowledge,
> which views knowledge as propositional content, the validity of
> which is determined in a discourse removed from action. (...) I'm
> starting to think that maybe it's possible to dig up some passages
> from Habermas which give a role to the human body in the formation
> of knowledge.

So you mean by 'knowledge' something else than a proposition that is
true? - By the way, have you checked what Lauri Routila has said on
these issues? I'm asking this because he critisized Habermas' interest
theory of knowledge from phenomenological standpoint (by asking e.g.
where H. left the theoretical interest; on what interest H's theory
is based except on theoretical one etc. - here the relation of the
question of knowledge to that of body can be easily opened).

Sincerely, Jukka L

PS. For the rest of the humankind: Lauri Routila is the central figure
of the early Finnish phenomenology, former student of Heildegger. The
latter was so fond of L.R. that accepted him as guest to his
Schwarzwald cottage. There they had a competition. They competed who
chopped more wood. Good old physical activity that only living bodies
can do. Routila was younger, son of a truck driver and was accustomed
to physical exercises, but Heidegger won, according to L.R.