Adorno's Authenticity text

[Ralph Dumain]

I don't recall the example of "is", but I'll take your word for it.  As for 
Bourdieu's assumptions, my memory is not exact, but it would seem he calls 
into question Heidegger's whole method, especially its way of insulating 
itself from any criticism or even rational evaluation, but also its 
pretension to greater insight (why should Heidegger's conceptions of 
seemingly ordinary concepts be any more profound than their ordinary senses?).

I can no longer remember Lukacs' critique.  THE DESTRUCTION OF REASON has a 
main theme the bogus notion of intellectual intuition, which gets its big 
boost historically from Schelling.  My guess then is that Lukacs' critique 
would go right to the main ontological and epistemological issues of 
subjective idealism.

Which reminds me, while the argumentative basis between Lukacs and Adorno 
in aesthetics is well documented (I believe the most relevant documents are 
collected in AESTHETICS AND POLITICS), I am only aware of a couple of 
sentences Adorno wrote on Lukacs' THE DESTRUCTION OF REASON.  Adorno 
asserts this book only amounts to evidence of the destruction of Lukacs' 
own reason.  Also, that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, etc. were in their own way 
protesting against reification.  I find this extremely lame, pathetic 
really.  Did Adorno write anything else on Lukacs' book?  And, as I've 
asked several times, is there any secondary literature that seriously 
compares the critiques of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl, etc., on the 
part of Lukacs and Adorno, respectively?

At 03:38 PM 4/21/2003 -0400, James Rovira wrote:
>I'm really glad you brought up Adorno's _Jargon of Authenticity_ again, 
>Ralph...we started talking about this awhile back and the discussion fell 
>by the wayside.  I agree that Adorno wrote a convincing critique of 
>Heidegger, but I'm not sure he wrote a fatal critique of Heidegger.
>
>For example, Adorno says at one point that Heidegger takes the word "is," 
>which in Adorno's opinion is an empty concept (in itself) that only links 
>subjects to predicates, and fills the word up to the point where it 
>represents the ground of being.
>
>This doesn't constitute an infallible argument, though.  All Adorno is 
>telling us at this point is that his assumptions are different from 
>Heidegger's.  We already knew that.
>
>It's also not clear that Heidegger's ontology _necessarily_ leads to 
>fascism.   Adorno seems to ignore other existentialists who didn't go in 
>for fascism at all; who resisted it, in fact, via their existentialism.
>
>Jim