any result, lacanians - marxistphilosophy

Kareem Khalifa kareem at khalifa.org
Sat, 12 Apr 2003 12:26:40 -0400


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Dear Frankfurters,

This philosophy of science discussion is one of the better threads I've =
seen on this list, and has been enjoyable to follow. A few thoughts have =
occurred to me along the way:

1) It is worth noting that many anglophone philosophers of social =
science writing since the mid-eighties think there is no a priori =
distinction between natural and social sciences. To put this very =
starkly, this has a lot more to do with how postpostivist philosophy of =
natural science has debunked the mythology of there being "the" =
scientific method. The lessons to learn from Quine, Kuhn, etc. is that =
things like "interpretation" are a necessary part of natural science as =
well as the social sciences. Cf. Bohman's New Philosophy of Social =
Science, Henderson's Explanation and Interpretation in the Human =
Sciences, Risjord's Woodcutters and Witchcraft.=20

2) Before we were careful to note that H&A were making astute claims for =
their time, but Ralph's recent remarks suggest that he still wants to =
make a pronouncement on more recent social science:=20
"The shallow scientism of the empiricist sociology I had to suffer some =
decades back is based on statistical number crunching and trivial =
hypothesis testing, but obscures the fundamental=20
characteristics of social structure that need to be studied."
I'm inclined to say that while this is a necessary component of =
empirical sociology, it's not sufficient for sociology writ large. =
Sociologists also try to establish theories; unlike physics, the =
division between theoretical and empirical analysis is not as easily =
traversed. As a result, it's not always clear how, e.g., empirical =
sociology falsifies or bolsters theoretical sociology.=20

But a major upshot of postpositivist philosophy of science is that the =
reasons for the greater fluidity between theoretical and empirical =
physics versus that found in sociology is not a priori in character; =
there don't appear to be any claims (at least not any irrefutable ones) =
about the ontological differences between humans and bits of matter that =
can account for this (other than that the former are more complex, but =
this is to say that there is a quantitative, not qualitative =
difference): human beings can exhibit statistically regular behavior, =
and physicists "interpret" the behavior of subatomic particles to square =
with some theories they hold.

3) A caveat of this: Ralph, I'd be interested in hearing more about what =
you mean by "the ontological differences among the objects of study =
(i.e. of the various natural and social sciences) com[ing] first, as =
they determine the methods most appropriate to them." Part of my concern =
here is that there are certain ways of interpreting this sentence that =
harken back to a pre-Kantian dogmatic realism. My first impulse is to =
assert that epistemology precedes ontology. In particular, it seems as =
if any claims that an object of natural or social scientific study =
exists is a claim liable to justification (assuming justificaiton is =
epistemology's domain). A fortiori, any claims saying that such objects =
exist in a certain way (e.g., are the bearer of particular properties =
and predicates) are also liable to justification. Thus, it would seem =
that the ontological differences you speak of presuppose the =
methodological commitments you claim are their consequences (I'm =
thinking here of Hacking's work, especially Representing and =
Intervening). Now admittedly, you may have had something else in mind by =
ontology and methodology, so feel free to articulate the meanings of =
those terms in further detail.

Best,
Kareem Khalifa

----- Original Message -----=20
  From: Ralph Dumain=20
  To: frankfurt-school@lists.village.virginia.edu=20
  Cc: marxistphilosophy@yahoogroups.com=20
  Sent: Saturday, April 12, 2003 10:41 AM
  Subject: Re: any result, lacanians - marxistphilosophy


  "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor=20
  chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace =
both.=20
  "  -- Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Preface

  I have to leave soon for an anti-war protest, so this time I'll brief, =

  though I have more to say.  For me, the ontological differences among =
the=20
  objects of study (i.e. of the various natural and social sciences) =
come=20
  first, as they determine the methods most appropriate to them.  While =
the=20
  spirit of scientific theorizing (scientific idealization, not merely=20
  empirical generalization) is the same in all cases, the appropriate =
methods=20
  vary according to the objects of study, as well as the nature of any=20
  lawlike properties discovered.  The shallow scientism of the =
empiricist=20
  sociology I had to suffer some decades back is based on statistical =
number=20
  crunching and trivial hypothesis testing, but obscures the fundamental =

  characteristics of social structure that need to be studied.  The =
unity of=20
  science does not consist in an obsession with quantification to the=20
  exclusion of other considerations, nor in ignoring the qualitative=20
  differences among the objects of study.  The world picture is unified =
with=20
  the recognition of internal differentiation and stratification.  This =
is=20
  hardly a new thought; anyone studying Marxism should know it, which=20
  suggests how little people interested in critical theory nowadays care =

  about Marxism.  This view can be found in a number of places, not just =
in=20
  dialectical materialism.  There is Roy Wood Sellars' critical realism, =
for=20
  example (see PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUTURE, 1949), not to mention Roy =
Bhaskar's=20
  critical realism (whose followers act is if his ideas are brand new,=20
  whereas what's new primarily are his neologisms.)

  At 07:18 PM 4/11/2003 +0300, j laari wrote:
  >Ralph, tell me what was the note at the end of your post where you
  >wrote about the ontological difference of natural and social =
sciences?
  >See, sciences can also be demarcated according to the characteristics
  >of their methods. In other words, and according to Heinrich Rickert:
  >there are two irreducible viewpoints on differences between sciences,
  >'materially' we make a distinction between the objects of sciences,
  >'formally' the distinction is between the methods. One can utilize
  >'natural scientific' method also in cultural sciences (as Rickert =
them
  >calls), but 'historical method' is of lesser use in natural sciences,
  >though Rickert himself believed it has some relevance also for nat'l
  >sci's. I don't go into details. See the nearest English translation =
of
  >his "Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft" (1921).
  >
  >Sincerely, Jukka L



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<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Dear Frankfurters,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>This philosophy of science discussion =
is one of the=20
better threads I've seen on this list, and has been enjoyable to follow. =
A few=20
thoughts have occurred to me along the way:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>1) It is worth noting that many =
anglophone=20
philosophers of social science writing since the mid-eighties think =
there is=20
no&nbsp;a priori distinction&nbsp;between natural and social sciences. =
To put=20
this very starkly, this has a lot more to do with how postpostivist =
philosophy=20
of natural science has debunked the mythology of there being "the" =
scientific=20
method. The lessons to learn from Quine, Kuhn, etc. is that things like=20
"interpretation" are a necessary part of natural science as well as the =
social=20
sciences. Cf. Bohman's New Philosophy of Social Science, Henderson's =
Explanation=20
and Interpretation in the Human Sciences, Risjord's Woodcutters and =
Witchcraft.=20
</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>2) Before we were careful to note that =
H&amp;A were=20
making astute claims for their time, but Ralph's recent remarks suggest =
that he=20
still wants to make a pronouncement on more recent social science: =
</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>"<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3>The shallow=20
scientism of the empiricist sociology I had to suffer some decades back =
is based=20
on statistical number crunching and trivial hypothesis testing, but =
obscures the=20
fundamental <BR>characteristics of social structure that need to be=20
studied."</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I'm inclined to say that while this is =
a necessary=20
component of empirical sociology, it's not sufficient for sociology writ =
large.=20
Sociologists also try to establish theories; unlike physics, the =
division=20
between theoretical and empirical analysis is not as easily =
traversed.&nbsp;As a=20
result, it's not always&nbsp;clear how, e.g., empirical&nbsp;sociology =
falsifies=20
or bolsters theoretical sociology. </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>But a major upshot of postpositivist =
philosophy of=20
science is that the reasons for the greater fluidity between theoretical =
and=20
empirical physics versus that found in sociology is not a priori in =
character;=20
there don't appear to be any&nbsp;claims&nbsp;(at least not any =
irrefutable=20
ones) about the ontological differences between humans and bits of =
matter that=20
can account for this (other than that the former are more complex, but =
this is=20
to say that there is a quantitative, not qualitative difference): human =
beings=20
can exhibit statistically regular behavior, and physicists "interpret" =
the=20
behavior of subatomic particles to square with some theories they=20
hold.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>3) A caveat of this: Ralph, I'd be =
interested in=20
hearing more about what you mean by "<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3>the=20
ontological differences among the objects of study (i.e. of the various =
natural=20
and social sciences) com[ing] first, as they determine the methods most=20
appropriate to them." Part of my concern here is that there are certain =
ways of=20
interpreting this sentence that harken back to a pre-Kantian dogmatic =
realism.=20
My first impulse is to assert that epistemology precedes ontology. In=20
particular, it seems as if any claims that an object of natural or =
social=20
scientific study exists&nbsp;is a claim liable to justification =
(assuming=20
justificaiton is epistemology's domain). A fortiori, any claims saying =
that such=20
objects exist in a certain way (e.g., are the bearer of particular =
properties=20
and predicates)&nbsp;are also liable to justification.&nbsp;Thus, it =
would seem=20
that the ontological&nbsp;differences&nbsp;you speak =
of&nbsp;presuppose&nbsp;the=20
methodological commitments&nbsp;you&nbsp;claim are their consequences =
(I'm=20
thinking here of Hacking's work, especially Representing and =
Intervening). Now=20
admittedly, you may have had something else in mind by ontology and =
methodology,=20
so feel free to&nbsp;articulate the meanings of those terms in further=20
detail.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Best,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Kareem Khalifa</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
  <A title=3Drdumain@igc.org href=3D"mailto:rdumain@igc.org">Ralph =
Dumain</A> </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A=20
  title=3Dfrankfurt-school@lists.village.virginia.edu=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:frankfurt-school@lists.village.virginia.edu">frankfurt-sch=
ool@lists.village.virginia.edu</A>=20
  </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Cc:</B> <A=20
  title=3Dmarxistphilosophy@yahoogroups.com=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:marxistphilosophy@yahoogroups.com">marxistphilosophy@yahoo=
groups.com</A>=20
  </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Saturday, April 12, 2003 =
10:41=20
  AM</DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: any result, =
lacanians -=20
  marxistphilosophy</DIV>
  <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial =
size=3D2></FONT><FONT=20
  face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
  size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial=20
  size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial=20
  size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial=20
  size=3D2></FONT><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>"In the =
analysis of=20
  economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor <BR>chemical =
reagents are of=20
  use. The force of abstraction must replace both. <BR>"&nbsp; -- Karl =
Marx,=20
  Capital, vol. 1, Preface<BR><BR>I have to leave soon for an anti-war =
protest,=20
  so this time I'll brief, <BR>though I have more to say.&nbsp; For me, =
the=20
  ontological differences among the <BR>objects of study (i.e. of the =
various=20
  natural and social sciences) come <BR>first, as they determine the =
methods=20
  most appropriate to them.&nbsp; While the <BR>spirit of scientific =
theorizing=20
  (scientific idealization, not merely <BR>empirical generalization) is =
the same=20
  in all cases, the appropriate methods <BR>vary according to the =
objects of=20
  study, as well as the nature of any <BR>lawlike properties =
discovered.&nbsp;=20
  The shallow scientism of the empiricist <BR>sociology I had to suffer =
some=20
  decades back is based on statistical number <BR>crunching and trivial=20
  hypothesis testing, but obscures the fundamental <BR>characteristics =
of social=20
  structure that need to be studied.&nbsp; The unity of <BR>science does =
not=20
  consist in an obsession with quantification to the <BR>exclusion of =
other=20
  considerations, nor in ignoring the qualitative <BR>differences among =
the=20
  objects of study.&nbsp; The world picture is unified with <BR>the =
recognition=20
  of internal differentiation and stratification.&nbsp; This is =
<BR>hardly a new=20
  thought; anyone studying Marxism should know it, which <BR>suggests =
how little=20
  people interested in critical theory nowadays care <BR>about =
Marxism.&nbsp;=20
  This view can be found in a number of places, not just in =
<BR>dialectical=20
  materialism.&nbsp; There is Roy Wood Sellars' critical realism, for=20
  <BR>example (see PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUTURE, 1949), not to mention Roy=20
  Bhaskar's <BR>critical realism (whose followers act is if his ideas =
are brand=20
  new, <BR>whereas what's new primarily are his neologisms.)<BR><BR>At =
07:18 PM=20
  4/11/2003 +0300, j laari wrote:<BR>&gt;Ralph, tell me what was the =
note at the=20
  end of your post where you<BR>&gt;wrote about the ontological =
difference of=20
  natural and social sciences?<BR>&gt;See, sciences can also be =
demarcated=20
  according to the characteristics<BR>&gt;of their methods. In other =
words, and=20
  according to Heinrich Rickert:<BR>&gt;there are two irreducible =
viewpoints on=20
  differences between sciences,<BR>&gt;'materially' we make a =
distinction=20
  between the objects of sciences,<BR>&gt;'formally' the distinction is =
between=20
  the methods. One can utilize<BR>&gt;'natural scientific' method also =
in=20
  cultural sciences (as Rickert them<BR>&gt;calls), but 'historical =
method' is=20
  of lesser use in natural sciences,<BR>&gt;though Rickert himself =
believed it=20
  has some relevance also for nat'l<BR>&gt;sci's. I don't go into =
details. See=20
  the nearest English translation of<BR>&gt;his "Kulturwissenschaft und=20
  Naturwissenschaft" (1921).<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt;Sincerely, Jukka=20
L<BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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