Horkheimer: Traditional & Critical Theory (4)
Ralph Dumain
rdumain at igc.org
Fri, 11 Apr 2003 13:19:46 -0400
(15)
"The concept of necessity in the critical theory is itself a critical
concept; it presupposes freedom, even if a not yet existent freedom. But
the idea of freedom as a purely interior reality which is always there even
when men are enslaved is typical of the idealist mentality. The tendency
immanent in this not wholly false but surely distorted conception of
freedom was most clearly expressed by the young Fichte: "I am now fully
convinced that the human will is free and that the purpose of our existence
is not to be happy but only to deserve happiness." Here we see the real
identity underlying fundamental metaphysical polarities and schools. The
claim that events are absolutely necessary means in the last analysis the
same thing as the claim to be really free here and now: resignation in
practice.
"The inability to grasp in thought the unity of theory and practice and the
limitation of the concept of necessity to inevitable events are both due,
from the viewpoint of theory of knowledge, to the Cartesian dualism of
thought and being. That dualism is congenial both to nature and to
bourgeois society in so far as the latter resembles a natural mechanism.
The idea of a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the
self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution, is beyond
the grasp of a mentality typified by such a dualism. If scholars do not
merely think about such a dualism but really take it seriously, they cannot
act independently. In keeping with their own way of thinking, they can put
into practice only what the closed causal system of reality determines them
to do, or they count only as individual units in a statistic for which the
individual unit really has no significance. As rational beings they are
helpless and isolated. The realization that such a state of affairs exists
is indeed a step towards changing it, but unfortunately the situation
enters bourgeois awareness only in a metaphysical, ahistorical shape. In
the form of a faith in the unchangeableness of the social structure it
dominates the present. Reflecting on themselves men see themselves only as
onlookers, passive participants in a mighty process which may be foreseen
but not modified. Necessity for them refers not to events which man masters
to his own purposes but only to events which he anticipates as probable.
Where the interconnection of willing and thinking, thought and action is
admitted as in many sectors of the most recent sociology, it is seen only
as adding to that objective complexity which the observer must take into
account. The thinker must relate all the theories which are proposed to the
practical attitudes and social strata which they reflect. But he removes
himself from the affair; he has no concern except--science.
"The hostility to theory as such which prevails in contemporary public life
is really directed against the transformative activity associated with
critical thinking. Opposition starts as soon as theorists fail to limit
themselves to verification and classification by means of categories which
are as neutral as possible, that is, categories which are indispensable to
inherited ways of life. Among the vast majority of the ruled there is the
unconscious fear that theoretical thinking might show their painfully won
adaptation to reality to be perverse and unnecessary. Those who profit from
the status quo entertain a general suspicion of any intellectual
independence. The tendency to conceive theory as the opposite of a positive
outlook is so strong that even the inoffensive traditional type of theory
suffers from it at times. Since the most advanced form of thought at
present is the critical theory of society and every consistent intellectual
movement that cares about man converges upon it by its own inner logic,
theory in general falls into disrepute. Every other kind of scientific
statement which does not offer a deposit of facts in the most familiar
categories and, if possible, in the most neutral form, the mathematical, is
already accused of being theoretical.
"This positivist attitude need not be simply hostile to progress. Although
in the intensified class conflicts of recent decades rulers have had to
rely increasingly on the real apparatus of power, ideology is nonetheless
still a fairly important cohesive force for holding together a social
structure threatened with collapse. In the determination to look at facts
alone and to surrender every kind of illusion there still lurks, even
today, something like a reaction against the alliance of metaphysics and
oppression.
"It would be a mistake, however, not to see the essential distinction
between the empiricist Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and that of
today. In the eighteenth century a new society had already been developed
within the framework of the old. The task now was to free an already
existent bourgeois economy from its feudal limitations and to let it
operate freely. Bourgeois scientific thought, too, needed, fundamentally,
only to shake off the old dogmatic chains in order to progress along a path
it had already mapped out. Today, on the contrary, in the transition from
the present form of society to a future one mankind will for the first time
be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life. There is
still need of a conscious reconstruction of economic relationships.
Indiscriminate hostility to theory, therefore, is a hindrance today. Unless
there is continued theoretical effort, in the interest of a rationally
organized future society, to shed critical light on present-day society and
to interpret it in the light of traditional theories elaborated in the
special sciences, the ground is taken from under the hope of radically
improving human existence. The demand therefore for a positive outlook and
for acceptance of a subordinate position threatens, even in progressive
sectors of society, to overwhelm any openness to theory. The issue,
however, is not simply the theory of emancipation; it is the practice of it
as well."
(Excellent.)
(16) In an extended analysis of the history of capitalism and hence of the
social theory associated with it, Horkheimer touches on the issues of the
relationship between thought (theory) and time (the essential or changing
nature of the object of investigation), and the related consequences of the
relation between subject and object (the theoretician and society). In the
present historical period of crisis, slouching toward barbarism, "true
theory is more critical than affirmative".
(17) POSTSCRIPT: Horkheimer commences a postscript to his essay by stating:
"In the preceding essay I pointed out two ways of knowing: one is based on
the Discourse on Method, the other on Marx's critique of political economy.
Theory in the traditional sense established by Descartes and everywhere
practiced in the pursuit of the specialized sciences organizes experience
in the light of questions which arise out of life in present-day society."
I am not entirely happy with this formulation. The point on which
interpretation turns is the phrase "two ways of knowing". I don't agree
that two ways of knowing are involved at all, but rather two ways of
orienting oneself with respect to social being that determine how the
enterprise of knowing is ideologically contoured. I fear that this
distinction may be lost on my reader without careful deliberation; it is a
distinction I've been aiming at all along. Similarly, in tracing the
methodology of modern science to Descartes, Horkheimer does not distinguish
the philosophical/ideological framework of Descartes (corresponding to an
emergent form of social organization) from the intrinsic nature of
theoretical scientific reasoning distinct from the former and
distinguishable from the dualism that serves a social, ideological role
formulated in philosophical terms.
(18) Critical social theory agrees with German idealism in the dynamic
relation of subject to object in opposition to the conformist worship of
brute fact. Critical theory agrees with materialism in its understanding
of labor and class and their impact on subjectivity. Traditional theory
corresponds to the social role of the specialist. Critical theory
corresponds to the emancipatory interest in the rational reorganization of
the whole of society for human benefit and not just the interest of an
increase in knowledge, analogous to the function of ancient Greek
philosophy in a certain period.
"Critique, however, is not identical with its object. Philosophy has not
provided a teaching on national economy. The curves of the mathematical
political economics of our day are no more able to maintain a link with
essentials than are positivist or existential philosophy. Concepts in these
disciplines have lost any relation to the fundamental situations of the
age. Rigorous investigation has always required the isolating of
structures, but today the guidelines for this process are no longer being
supplied, as in Adam Smith's time, by conscious, inspiring, historical
concerns. Modem analyses have lost all connection with any rounded
knowledge that deals with historical reality. It is left to others or to a
later generation or to accident to establish a relation of the analyses to
reality and specific goals. As long as there is a social demand for and
recognition of such activity, the sciences are not disturbed by reality or
leave the care of it to other disciplines, for example sociology or
philosophy, which of course act the same way in turn. The forces which
guide the life of society, those rulers of the day, are thereby tacitly
accepted by science itself as judges of its meaning and value, and
knowledge is declared powerless."
Critical theory also differs from specialized science in that it continues
to be a philosophical discipline and not just economic science; its content
is the transformation of the concepts dominating economic
organization. Thereupon follows a critique of economism.
(19) FINIS. Horkheimer's essay is of very high quality and subtle in its
analysis, but there is a subtle distinction missing from it I have tried to
pinpoint now and again, albeit with insufficient precision and
clarity. I will pursue a summary overview if my time permits and other
people's interest warrants it.