H. & A. & Marxism

[matthew piscioneri]

List,

Can anyone point me in the direction of a specific discussion (or comment 
upon themselves) of how Marxism fares in H. & A.'s dialectic of 
enlightenment. Most of the emphasis is on bourgeois philosophy and fascism. 
Are we to take marxism as being lumped in with these? In the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, in a passage that can surely be applied equally to the 
developmental trajectory of Twentieth Century fascist, democratic/capitalist 
and Marxist ideological movements, Horkheimer and Adorno write:

"The history of the old religions and schools like that of the modern 
parties and revolutions teaches us that the price for survival is practical 
involvement, the transformation of ideas into domination."(1995: 215)

It is precisely this recognition of the “transformation of ideas into 
domination” which appears to justify the assertion that Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s thesis on the dialectical inversion of enlightened reason applies 
equally to the category of critical reason.
	Do Horkheimer and Adorno subtly draw the category of critical reason into 
their overarching critique of reason on the basis of the scientific 
character of Marx’s critique of political economy? By this I mean, 
Horkheimer and Adorno consider the scientific basis of Marx’s critical 
social theory to be a type of positivism. In this way, Marx’s critical 
social theory and its “scientific” derivatives are as liable to their 
critique of positivism as all other instantiations of postivist reason in 
the natural, technical and physical sciences.
	This covert characterization of Marx’s theory of value as a type of 
positivism poses the question: Why was Horkheimer and Adorno’s criticism of 
Marxism so muted? Clearly, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment the theoretical 
target of their critique is positivist reason whilst the substantive target 
of their polemic is European fascism in the first place, and then, the 
oppressive administered society “manufactured” and maintained under advanced 
capitalism by the culture industry. It would be expected that given 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Marxist heritage that their direct criticism of 
Marx’s work and Soviet Marxism would be muted in comparison to their 
anti-fascist and anti-capitalist polemics. This interpretation is supported 
by Habermas when he writes:

"Critical Theory was initially developed in Horkheimer’s circle to think 
through political disappointments at the absence of revolution in the West, 
the development of Stalinism in Soviet Russia, and the victory of fascism in 
Germany. It was supposed to explain mistaken Marxist prognoses, but without 
breaking with Marxist intentions."(1987: 116)

In other words, Horkheimer and Adorno did not want to turn their backs 
altogether on the heritage of Marxist thought. Rather, it would appear, that 
even in the later stages of Critical Theory they aimed to hold onto at the 
very least the critical moment of Marxist critique whilst jettisoning the 
positive or prescriptive moment of the critical reason embedded in Marxist 
critical social theory, which was most susceptible to dialectical inversion 
with the destructive consequences they witnessed in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Significantly, and this is the third point I wish to make, as the two 
passages  quoted above indicate, there is a more overt critique of Marxism 
in the second and later Introduction (1969) [#2] than that which is evident 
in the original Introduction (1944) [#1]. Perhaps the reasons are obvious.

One final passage from the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Concluding their 
chapter “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality”, they write of the Marquis 
de Sade and Nietzsche:

"They [Sade and Nietzsche] were significantly unlike the logical positivists 
in taking science at its word. The fact that Sade and Nietzsche insist on 
the ratio more decisively even than logical positivism, implicitly liberates 
from its hiding-place the utopia contained in the Kantian notion of reason 
as in every great philosophy: the utopia of a humanity which, itself no 
longer distorted, has no further need to distort."(1995: 119)

Although not stated, Horkheimer and Adorno do not exclude Marxism from the 
category of great “merciful” philosophies:

"Inasmuch as the merciless doctrines proclaim the identity of domination and 
reason, they are more merciful than those of the moralistic lackeys of the 
bourgeoisie. “Where do your greatest dangers lie?” was the question 
Nietzsche once posed himself, and answered thus: “In compassion.” With his 
denial he redeemed the unshakable confidence in man that is constantly 
betrayed by every form of assurance that seeks only to console. (1995: 119)

Any non-oppressive thoughts on the above?

mattP.



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