NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (1)

[Hector Rottweiller Jr.'s Place]

Eric Oberle writes:

> <opening paragraphs snipped>
> The following sentence approximates some of the uncertainty at least,
> though it too is rather inelegant:
> 
> "That which once, in comparison to sensory appearance and to every
> outwardly-directed experience,  felt itself as the utterly unnaive, has,
> objectively, become as naive as Goethe felt those miserable [doctoral]
> candidates of 150 years ago, who, subjectively, tried to make themselves
> rich in speculation.  "
> 
> As for who is being referred to, I do not know either, though we can be
> sure it is not Hegelians--1819 would be a bit early for such, and Adorno's
> description of naive empiricism and lazy subjectivism doesn't fit any of
> them.  More likely were dealing with Fichteans, i.e. subjective idealists,
> rather than objective idealists like Hegel.  One could guess that perhaps
> one is dealing with religious-oriented subjectivism of the Schelling or
> even the Herderian type.  Some years ago, I searched Goethe's Dichtung und
> Wahrheit for this reference, but in vain.
> 

	Thanks for the gloss on who the "seedy scholars/miserable candidates"
might have been, but I'm still wondering to whom or what Adorno is referring 
when he speaks of philosophy's present naivete.  

> This sentence and the one following it are actually worth the effort of
> trying to achieve some more historical specificity, however, for the
> general gesture of these sentences is one of thought moving outward, from
> the paradigm of self-reflection into the world, and the historical
> referents that Adorno uses to think about this movement is far from
> irrelevant.  

	Not only the historical referents, but also the contemporary ones,
no?  Adorno's attacks on Heideigger aren't just philosophical debates,
but anti-fascist maneuvers.  So the historical figures and trends Adorno 
takes on ought, similarily, to have social and political significance; in
turn, that social and political significance sheds light on his philosophical
argumentation.  Because Adorno won't let the social and political aspects
of philosophy drop, those for whom philosphy is the simon-pure contemplation
of Being want to dismiss him as beneath their notice; on the other hand, 
because Adorno won't let the philosophical questions that inhere in the
social and the political drop, those for whom the primacy of practice 
means party organization want to castigate him as an irovy-tower intellectual.
But because he will not drop either aspect, nor subordinate one to the
other, his work stikes at the heart of the limitations of these two 
perspectives.

--
Curtiss Leung
hncl@panix.com