myth and reason

[kenneth.mackendrick]

> > Freud defines religion in the first place as a regressive activity.  
> 
> Might be so. But from that it doesn't follow that all regressive 
> activities are religious ones! Secondly, it's not a 'definion' of 
> religion but rather a characterisation of it. 

In my understanding of Freud he defines religion as a regressive activity.  He is 
begging the question here - since his premises are based upon the validity of the 
conclusion.
> 

> I don't know what functionalism could be in philosophy, though your 
> point concerns language (which worries me a bit, because genuine 
> philosophical and theoretical problems aren't reducible to questions 
> of language, at least not all of them). But in social sciences it 
> means something like that: institutions etc. have specific functions 
> to fulfill in society. In creeps the teleology, and questions 
> concerning the origins or genesis of those institutions will be 
> displaced. Yet, there surely are functional dependencies in social 
> world... But back to the issue: even 'linguistic functionalism' 
> doesn't mean theology.

Right, the idea of positivism = theology doesn't make complete sense in terms of 
functionalism.  No, I do not think functionalism is theological (although I suppose it 
COULD be based upon an idea of a negative theology - "since we cannot express 
in philosophy or language what actually is then we rely upon metaphor and 
functional definitions to guide our way."  The problem with functionalism is that it 
lacks content and therefore provides a reified analysis all of the time.  When you 
define religion functionally (say, as a person's ultimate concern - they you must 
define everything else functionally as well otherwise the contradiction between 
functional definitions and metaphysics collapses the coherence between the two - 
ie. the idea of ultimate concern must inlcude functional definitions of metaphor, 
myth, faith etc. which then again must be supplemented with more functional 
definitions etc etc.  The bottom line is that functionalism never quite touches reality 
at all).
> 
> > The reason why I think identity thinking is ground in mysticism is 
> > because it relies upon personal experience yet posits metaphysical 
> > universals from within the particular by dissolving the tension 
> > between the two.  The dialectical tension between language and 
> > reality, identity and non-identity breaks this mysticism.
> 
> Sorry but I don't understand that. 
> 
When you collapse the tension between the subjective and objective you do so in 
a context of authority.  Authority is only granted to something if its source is viewed 
as sacred and unquestionable.  Habermas tries to break with this by discussing 
rational legitimacy but this is suspect because the conversation in which we live is 
one implicated with domination and therefore no conversation at all (paraphrase of 
Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society).

> > Theologians are a funny bunch.  Theology is basically a term 
> > created by the christian church for the christian church (as far 
> > as i can see).  MOST theologians compare theology to science - but 
> > their are several fundamental differences.  Theology is based upon 
> > a faith in the authority of the church, the revelation inherent in 
> > scripture etc.  It is sanctioned by a legislative body of elders (or 
> >  whatever).  [etc.] 
> 
> Hmm? I'd call theology a science because it's an academic discipline. 
> And they do follow rules (concerning argumentation, demonstration 
> etc.) that are scientific enough to justify theology as an academic 
> discipline. Most of theologians might be religious and they might 
> rely in a last instance to the authorities of their churces in 
> 'spiritual' questions, but that doesn't chance the fact that what 
> they do as researchers or scholars is governed by academic world. 
> They simply have to follow the 'scientific rules'. 

Sure - but when it comes down to it the presuppositions of science are not 
scientifically determined nor are they open to scientific scrutiny (the deity brought 
us in and the deity will take us out - the ideological circle is closed since 
ultimately the unquestioned premises will also dictate the conclusions).  They are 
ideologically closed.   This contradicts the openness that science associates itself 
with.
> 
> > > I don't get the picture and I can't accept such generalisations 
> > > as "society as implicitly religious".
> > 
> > Why not?  Society is very very religious.  
> 
> Might be so. But religion isn't essential to society: Concept of 
> society doesn't implicate religion. Religion isn't necessary for a 
> society to exist. 

How do we know this?  I wonder if this goes back to the division of labour and the 
dialectic of enlightenment.  The advances made in thought vs religion at the same 
time are tied up with the regressive tendencies of mythic thought and the further 
deification of progress. 

> Besides, democracy isn't a "ceremony"; capitalism isn't a "ceremony". 
> The latter is basically a way of organising societal (socio-economic) 
> relations, and the former, to put it bluntly, a political principle 
> (and ideal for most of us, I guess) of organising decision-making 
> concerning general common issues in societies. 

It might be.  Not much work has been done in this area.  Empirical research may 
indicate that the same attitute toward attending a religious service are also present 
in coming out for a protest rally or a democratic election - which would simply 
indicate that a religious tendency exists within capitalist-democratic culture (we 
have faith in freedom like a faith in the sacred).

> Well, now I'm too far away from my original interest in 
> 'non-identity' in frankfurters and parisians. Funny how discourses 
> take suprising directions... Can we now turn back to relations 
> between Adorno, Derrida, Deleuze, Marcuse...?

last post about this,
ken

thanks for the great insights and conversation.  perhaps it will be picked up again 
sometime.