myth and reason

[Jukka Laari]

Ken, 

thanks for clarification. 

First of all, I don't have problems with critiques of Freud. He was a 
child of his own period and understandably had difficulties to step 
above his time, so to speak. I've been concerned with what I see 
hasty and unjustified criticism, criticism that over-simplifies Freud 
and concentrates on some minor issues in theory. 

(Neo-) conservatives have had such a strategy - they are forced into 
it, because they can't provide substantial theoretical critique; so 
they take just some points, try to declare them invalid, and proceed 
to claims that whole 'freudian edifice' is bancrupt. Freud still gets 
to our nerves, both to ideologists of pure self-consciousness (who - 
by chance? - usually also promote individualism and doctrines of free 
will) and to protagonists of leftist theories. (Marxism-leninism was 
the clearest example: first systematic effort to translate the whole 
freudian corpus was made in Soviet-Russia in 1920's but as soon as 
ideological climate hardened Freud was thrown into wastebin as an 
irrational bourgeois ideologist - main reason being his indecent 
insistence on sexuality...?) Today, it seems that freudian theories 
are a thread to modern 'narcissism': as if living in a modern world 
demonstrates too effectively that we as subjects are overwhelmingly 
reliant on anonymous structures and institutions so that we don't 
want to be reminded of it in 'pure thinking'. 


> Freud defines religion in the first place as a regressive activity.  

Might be so. But from that it doesn't follow that all regressive 
activities are religious ones! Secondly, it's not a 'definion' of 
religion but rather a characterisation of it. 


> The strictly positivist - words and categories directly correspond 
> to their intended object - metaphysics, theology, scientism, etc).  
> Functionalism - where terms are defined ahead of time and possess
> no truth value at all (eg. defining something functionally - "this is 
> how i will use the term religion" 

Actually, it's correspondance theory of truth according to which 
there is correspondance between a proposition and state of things. 
It's not only 'positivists' who stick to it. On the other hand, also 
in analytical philosophy that particular theory has been heavily 
criticised. 

I don't know what functionalism could be in philosophy, though your 
point concerns language (which worries me a bit, because genuine 
philosophical and theoretical problems aren't reducible to questions 
of language, at least not all of them). But in social sciences it 
means something like that: institutions etc. have specific functions 
to fulfill in society. In creeps the teleology, and questions 
concerning the origins or genesis of those institutions will be 
displaced. Yet, there surely are functional dependencies in social 
world... But back to the issue: even 'linguistic functionalism' 
doesn't mean theology.


> The reason why I think identity thinking is ground in mysticism is 
> because it relies upon personal experience yet posits metaphysical 
> universals from within the particular by dissolving the tension 
> between the two.  The dialectical tension between language and 
> reality, identity and non-identity breaks this mysticism.

Sorry but I don't understand that. 


> Theologians are a funny bunch.  Theology is basically a term 
> created by the christian church for the christian church (as far 
> as i can see).  MOST theologians compare theology to science - but 
> their are several fundamental differences.  Theology is based upon 
> a faith in the authority of the church, the revelation inherent in 
> scripture etc.  It is sanctioned by a legislative body of elders (or 
>  whatever).  [etc.] 

Hmm? I'd call theology a science because it's an academic discipline. 
And they do follow rules (concerning argumentation, demonstration 
etc.) that are scientific enough to justify theology as an academic 
discipline. Most of theologians might be religious and they might 
rely in a last instance to the authorities of their churces in 
'spiritual' questions, but that doesn't chance the fact that what 
they do as researchers or scholars is governed by academic world. 
They simply have to follow the 'scientific rules'. 


> > I don't get the picture and I can't accept such generalisations 
> > as "society as implicitly religious".
> 
> Why not?  Society is very very religious.  

Might be so. But religion isn't essential to society: Concept of 
society doesn't implicate religion. Religion isn't necessary for a 
society to exist. 

Besides, democracy isn't a "ceremony"; capitalism isn't a "ceremony". 
The latter is basically a way of organising societal (socio-economic) 
relations, and the former, to put it bluntly, a political principle 
(and ideal for most of us, I guess) of organising decision-making 
concerning general common issues in societies. 

Well, now I'm too far away from my original interest in 
'non-identity' in frankfurters and parisians. Funny how discourses 
take suprising directions... Can we now turn back to relations 
between Adorno, Derrida, Deleuze, Marcuse...?

Yours, Jukka L