Urizen and Eros

[MSalter1@aol.com]

In a message dated 09/07/97 13:13:34 GMT, Ken writes:

<< A Reply
 
Ken says: If criticism is limited by its own terms then it does rely upon a
theological basis, 
 of which it cannot escape (since the idea of critique would be always 
 already unfulfilled by its own measure).  This theological basis secures
ideological 
 closure if it doesn't even promise the actual possibility of escaping the
viscious 
 hermeneutical circle.  

Michael replies Ken's argument mimics the ne-conservativism of Luhmann, who
uses it to deny the possibility of empirically grounded critique, to supply
grounds for his criticism of the groundless of critique. Your position
falsely ontologises and freezes the preliminary phase of immanent criticism,
and then draws formal conclusions from a reification that you have yourself
introduced - all in a sadly non-dialectical fashion. The whole idea of such
critique is step-bystep transcendence from within, rather than external
trashing. Since the object of critique is ultimately a mediation of the real
life processes of society at large, then "escape" is forever problematic.


Ken says: 

This is at the centre of Horkheimer and Adorno's idea of the 
 enlightenment - to brush the ideals of the enlightenment against themselves.
 This 
 kind of opening, negatively determined, leaves the idea of critique open to
a 
 postmetaphysical position - a kind of reconciliation with metaphysics.  On
Derrida's 
 terms this openness is foreclosed and locked in via his interpretation of
language 
 and grammar.  While deconstruction hopes to leave itself open to the other
it 
 cannot do so as long as the tenets of the subjective objective construction
are 
 disintegrated (which is not to say they are beyond critique) - which is
precisely why 
 Derrida runs into praxis problems and Horkheimer and Adorno don't encounter 
 them in the same way.  I suspect this problem appears because of the latent 
 anti-humanism institutionalised in too much of postmodern work.  Again -
this is 
 why I think that deconstruction affirms a mystical basis - since it begins
and ends 
 with metaphysics (a faith in hope infinitely postponed is no hope at all).
  I would argue that negative dialectics severs itself sharply from
deconstruction 
 precisely because of the humanist twist it lends itself to - something
which, in my 
 mind, should not be diminished in any way (which certainly does not place it
above 
 criticism).
 
 ken >>

I reply 


Adorno's work is particularly critical of humanism as an overly rosy
interpretation of a non-too rosy state of affairs which reads genuine ideals
into a status quo that, in practice, defrauds them. Such humanistic
reinterpretation lends unintentional support to the very forces then keep
humanism at bay - another good instance of immanent critique's transcendence
from within - no?

Michael Salter, who is not quite sure what Ken's reply is replying to