myth and reason

[kenneth.mackendrick]

> I wrote:
> 
> "On the one side we have mythic or archaic thinking - in which
> identity is assimilated into reality and, on the other side, modern
> thought - in which the individual is distinguished from her
> surroundings."
>
Jukka wrote: 

> I'd like to see you to expand your remarks (below) concerning 'self',
> 'subjectivity' and related concepts - I mean, you seem to imply, for
> example, that 'self' simply is (or means) 'subjectivity' that is
> identifiable to 'self-consciousness'. That would shed some light on
> your notion of identity assimilated into reality as mythic or archaic
> thinking. I've understood that it's also quite a modern way of
> thinking that identity of a person is based on his or her social
> relations; identifications with some other persons and social
> landscapes. Also I'd like to know who (and why) distinguishes
> individual from her surroundings: does it include reduction of
> identity to subjective experience (of identity)? What is gained in
> this way?

I would imagine the self, or the subject, is constituted by a great many things, 
conscious and unconscious.  Perhaps someone could elucidate for me a more 
articulate differentiation between the two but for now I'll use them 
interchangeably....  What I meant by mythic thinking is an individual who does not 
see or perceive any kind of logical space/time continuum or the notion of causality. 
 The sun comes up in the morning because the great Goddess caused it to come 
up.  Tomorrow it might not - depending on whether the Goddess wills it.  I am a tree 
and the tree is me.  If the tree dies I will die - because my soul resides in the tree.  
This is mythic thinking.  The self is not distinguished from reality.  
Self-consciousness is subsumed under the rubric of immediacy - even though both 
forms of thought - which push in different directions - are present simultaneously.  
For example - one cannot think theologically (talk from the perspective of God) 
without first being religious (talk about God) - and to some extent religion is based 
upon some sort of logical connection with the theological (I'm explicitly refering to 
monotheistic traditions here).
> 

> I'm afraid that theories of cyborgs (and the like) are pretty hasty
> constructions based on quite unarticulate conceptions of human
> subject. In that I do agree wholeheartedly with you. But i just wonder
> whether the idea of politics of desire as such is of more use. Would
> you clarify what you mean by that? How does the concept of desire
> contradict either Adorno's and Horkheimer's idea of subjectivity
> (loosely based on Freud's theory?) or those more traditional
> conceptions revolving around reflexive self-consciousness?

I'm not sure that the concept of desire contradicts Horkeheimer's and Adorno's 
work - although I would use the term with different ideas in mind I think.  I would 
argue that thought cannot be boiled down to reason rather desire itself is at the 
heart of the human subject - a desiring.  This is not to say that things cannot be 
rationalized, put to reason, etc. but in the end the bottom line is not a rational 
reconciled world but a world of passion, lack, creativity, eros etc.  Reason is an 
instrument that we use to make sense of our surroundings - but I perceive the 
notion of politics and desire to take a more centre stage in terms of why we do 
things.  Something inside us may push us toward living in a logical, rational, or 
reconciled way - but this push itself is not a rational fixture in the human psyche.  
Again - I want to stress that this does not mean the desire is irrational.  I like 
Marcuse's idea that eros and reason can and perhaps should be reconciled rather 
than duking it out in a pathological and lethal manner.
> 
> Secondly, about your very suprising remark that A&H "pursue an idea of
> subjectivity that is ground in a quasi-mysticism (where does
> subjectivity come from... freud was wrong after all)" which suggests
> Freud's theory as mysticism if A&H loosely rely on him - or is it
> freudian theory that's quasi-mysticism? Pretty funny, if intended as a
> joke.

I think Horkheimer and Adorno's idea of subjectivity is incomplete and based upon 
a kind of teleology that yields dangerous prescriptions.  The notion that things are 
bound to the idea of reconciliation can play out in dominating ways....  The 
presupositions about "man" are what I am concerned with here (which is an age old 
argument which has never adequately been resolved).  In many ways traditional 
critical theory is based upon a conception of "man" as white, male, theistic, 
heterosexual etc.  I've gotten in hot water before on this list for pointing this out - 
so I'll keep my thoughts to myself.  Freud makes similar mistakes.  I'll simply point 
out that the circle is not closed in critical theory - and the theory itself demands a 
reflective response on all sides.... Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno were all 
careful to revise their own work and apologize for things they had said, written, or 
participated in many instances....
 
> Would you explain: (a) in what sense Freud was wrong concerning the
> genesis of subjectivity? is his theory of psychic process as (more or
> less) three dimensional or consisting of three basic functions ('ego',
> 'super-ego', 'id') somehow misleading? how? in what sense is this
> theory mystical? (b) how exactly is A&H's concept of subjectivity (not
> to mention that of subject) sort of mystical, even in a loose sense?
> What's in it that makes it suspicous?

Freud was wrong about religion, sexuality, women, etc.  This will be familiar ground 
to those who have studied Freud's critics - so I won't go into too much detail.  The 
mystical basis for subjectivity appears when the concrete particular, the 
nonidentical, seeps into our categories.  A theological premise is revealed 
(sometimes) whenever our categories are used in an essentialist or functionalist 
way.  Slam away at me for this because i'm intentionally being slippery.
> 
> I'm asking this because I've thought i've been able to distinguish
> mysticism (as one's inexplicable, immediate, personal relationship
> with god) from conceptual (whether philosophical or theological)
> constructions concerning our relationships with 'divine'. Have I lost
> some crucial insight during the years? I mean, all criticisms
> concerning freudian theory as mysticism have based on more or less
> 'positivist' (that is, systematically empiricist) presuppositions.
> There are several reasons for Freud-critiques, but these have mainly
> to do with the internal and logical characteristics of his theory
> (actually; theories).

What I wonder about all this is whether all criticism is implicitly a form of 
mysticism - since it depends upon the individual subjective experience which then 
makes sweeping universal claims - which are safeguarded by saying other 
perspectives are alientated, reified, or deceived.  The idea of science as religion, 
society as implicitly religious, the self as spiritual, humanity as sacred etc. all 
point in this direction.  Even Habermas's idea of the lifeworld confirms this - that 
tension is disolved in the spellbinding power of the holy - the tension between 
truth and myth.  This is precisely why reason is so important and central - because 
it holds the power to break these 'gods and demons' although the break cannot be 
complete in an unreconciled reality (which tends to be a religious concept to begin 
with).

ken "save the world, boycott the economy" mackendrick