myth and reason

[j laari]

Ken, 

my point is not to get into some "mudwrestling" or whatever as
unpleasant activity. I simply have tried (and still try) to figure out
the relations of some basic concepts (originally thought by german
idealists). That's why I eagerly attach to your remarks.

You wrote:

"On the one side we have mythic or archaic thinking - in which
identity is assimilated into reality and, on the other side, modern
thought - in which the individual is distinguished from her
surroundings."

If we have a concept of identity, as we have had past two centuries,
then it's quite a questionable to identify straightforwardly the
questioning of (related) concepts of identity, subjectivity, (self-)
consciousness, perhaps even rationality, with mythic 'thinking' or
religion.

I'd like to see you to expand your remarks (below) concerning 'self',
'subjectivity' and related concepts - I mean, you seem to imply, for
example, that 'self' simply is (or means) 'subjectivity' that is
identifiable to 'self-consciousness'. That would shed some light on
your notion of identity assimilated into reality as mythic or archaic
thinking. I've understood that it's also quite a modern way of
thinking that identity of a person is based on his or her social
relations; identifications with some other persons and social
landscapes. Also I'd like to know who (and why) distinguishes
individual from her surroundings: does it include reduction of
identity to subjective experience (of identity)? What is gained in
this way?


"What i am getting at in all of this is whether the idea of the self
is coherent enough for the tasks that critical theory has assigned
itself. Adorno and Horkheimer pursue an idea of subjectivity that is
ground in a quasi-mysticism (where does subjectivity come from....
freud was wrong after all...) - however empirically and
psychoanalytically informed. This is not necessarily a bad thing - but
it lives in contradiction with other ways of looking at the self (one
could take Jung at his word - although personally i find this
particularly distasteful).  Those who have found this "modern" idea of
the self problematic have moved on to other categories, like cyborg or
posthuman. But i'm not sure this helps (actually, i'm pretty sure it
doesn't) - which is why i think the idea of the politics of desire is
helpful."

I'm afraid that theories of cyborgs (and the like) are pretty hasty
constructions based on quite unarticulate conceptions of human
subject. In that I do agree wholeheartedly with you. But i just wonder
whether the idea of politics of desire as such is of more use. Would
you clarify what you mean by that? How does the concept of desire
contradict either Adorno's and Horkheimer's idea of subjectivity
(loosely based on Freud's theory?) or those more traditional
conceptions revolving around reflexive self-consciousness?

Secondly, about your very suprising remark that A&H "pursue an idea of
subjectivity that is ground in a quasi-mysticism (where does
subjectivity come from... freud was wrong after all)" which suggests
Freud's theory as mysticism if A&H loosely rely on him - or is it
freudian theory that's quasi-mysticism? Pretty funny, if intended as a
joke.

Would you explain: (a) in what sense Freud was wrong concerning the
genesis of subjectivity? is his theory of psychic process as (more or
less) three dimensional or consisting of three basic functions ('ego',
'super-ego', 'id') somehow misleading? how? in what sense is this
theory mystical? (b) how exactly is A&H's concept of subjectivity (not
to mention that of subject) sort of mystical, even in a loose sense?
What's in it that makes it suspicous?

I'm asking this because I've thought i've been able to distinguish
mysticism (as one's inexplicable, immediate, personal relationship
with god) from conceptual (whether philosophical or theological)
constructions concerning our relationships with 'divine'. Have I lost
some crucial insight during the years? I mean, all criticisms
concerning freudian theory as mysticism have based on more or less
'positivist' (that is, systematically empiricist) presuppositions.
There are several reasons for Freud-critiques, but these have mainly
to do with the internal and logical characteristics of his theory
(actually; theories).

Yours, Jukka L

PS. It seems that Michael Salter is referring to the same direction
when he writes about Adorno that "it is worth reading his dialectical
critique of the idea of pure difference/non-identity/particularity
etc. in Negative Dialectics."  Surely Adorno wasn't on a road to
mysticism with, say, his conception of non-identity or non-identical?
So what might it be he's really saying...?