myth and reason, principles and responsibility

[kenneth.mackendrick]

ralph writes,

What
> I'm most concerned about is coherence and concentration of human mental
> power, self-possession and self-awareness, which must be based upon a
> fundamental simplicity that underlies all complexity.  It's knowing who and
> where you are, and not dissolving yourself into the diverse phenomena of the
> world so you forget who you are.

I guess this is the heart of the matter isn't it?  That there are fundamentally 
incompatible modes of thought - which can only be discerned through historical 
reflection - a dichotomy thesis if you will (back to Levy-Bruhl).  On the one side we 
have mythic or archaic thinking - in which identity is assimilated into reality 
and, on the other side, modern thought - in which the individual is distinguished 
from her surroundings.  The former is rightly, in my mind, understood as religious 
thought.  The latter as scientific thought.  Religion in large is mythic - where 'gods 
and demons' roam free.  Theology is a science - the rational and methodical study 
of the world from the perspective of the divine.  Don Wiebe argues this point in one 
of his books - "The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought."  Wiebe 
further goes on to argue that science itself, in a later book, is actually a religious 
activity - since it has no rational grounding (ergo some of us went to see "Men in 
Black").

If we look at some of the postmodern work - like Donna Haraway's "Manifesto for 
Cyborgs" - we see mythic thinking operating in full force.  The individual, in 
Haraway's mind, is actually an illusion since we are truly really part of everything 
else (resistance is futile - you have already been assimilated).

Wiebe's work is interesting in this regard - being the hard core critical rationalist 
that he is - he argues that things like freedom and understanding are theological 
concepts - yelling at the top of his lungs "Place a piece of freedom in my hand!!!!"  
His relentless attack on theology as myth and all forms of phenomenology as 
pathological fits (i'm paraphrasing here) he moves stalwardly on to pursue the idea 
of "knowledge for knowledge's sake - lashing out at the frankfurt school theorists 
by arguing that "your freedom is my cage" and Habermas.... "a moralist in 
spades."  His point in all this is that science, knowledge, truth, freedom, etc. is 
unjustifiable.  I wonder if this is the simplicity that Ralph is discussing.

What i am getting at in all of this is whether the idea of the self is coherent enough 
for the tasks that critical theory has assigned itself.  Adorno and Horkheimer 
pursue an idea of subjectivity that is ground in a quasi-mysticism (where does 
subjectivity come from.... freud was wrong after all...) - however empirically and 
psychoanalytically informed.  This is not necessarily a bad thing - but it lives in 
contradiction with other ways of looking at the self (one could take Jung at his word 
- although personally i find this particularly distasteful).  Those who have found this 
"modern" idea of the self problematic have moved on to other categories, like 
cyborg or posthuman.  But i'm not sure this helps (actually, i'm pretty sure it 
doesn't) - which is why i think the idea of the politics of desire is helpful.  But then 
this raises the spectre of alienation all over again doesn't it?

But i suppose all this misses the boat.  While i am here trying to get in touch with 
myself the machine is grinding others into chicken feed - which is why Marcuse in 
his later years began to advocate certain political positions (some circumstances 
are so horrific that they demand an immediate emotional response).

So again i'll ask the question, which pertains to moral philosophy in general - what 
do we do.  Are we bound by an ethic of responsibility which calls us from within 
(Levinas) or an ethic of principles which coordinate our activities in a neo-Kantian 
fashion (Habermas) - and where does one find solace - in the communicative 
coordination of action or the productive response of simply being honest with 
oneself (Heller).  And what constitutes the self to make either of these decisions.  
What counts as a good reason if when all is said and done my good reason is 
based upon something that i want.  Habermas ends the discussion in consensus, 
deconstructionists end the conversation in a leap of faith... but neither of these 
alternatives stikes my fancy.  The principles that Habermas discusses are based 
upon a kind of phenomenology... however postmetaphysically conceived.  An ethic 
of responsibility seems to be too microscopic to embrace exactly what needs to be 
held.

I wish Adorno had lived to write that third volume on moral philosophy.

ken