Deleuze & reason

[j laari]

First of all, I agree with those, who insist that "post-structuralism"
(Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault etc.) has made important and valuable
questions. Question is, how to utilise it. I'm not so sure about
"post-modernism" (Lyotard, Rorty etc.) but then again, I don't know
them much. However, I don't buy the idea, that "post-structuralism"
has somehow made older philosophies obsolete. After all, it isn't any
better itself.

In order to make my point at least somehow clear, I have to construct
a heuristic model first (I'll exaggerate a bit): there are two sort of
modern philosophies, basic stuff and social philosophy. The former
concentrates on eternal issues, such as the relation between the ideal
and real (or, material), the origins of world, of I, of nature, the
nature of nature, of I, of world, and (importantly) of being (of
beings), etc... The latter dismisses such 'old-fashioned' questions as
'metaphysical' and boldly goes to state, that since Hegel we have to
accept as the only reasonable insight that all there is, is
conceptually grasped, and therefore it doesn't make any sense to talk
about real as such: we can as well talk about concepts (or texts, as
Noelle suggests) only. Kant at least had 'das Ding an sich'... but he
was, after all, a first rate philosopher. So, this contemporary
post-hegelian theorisation is typical idealism. Even when they believe
they're 'materialists' or 'marxists'. That left room for vulgar or
reductionist materialism, for these dandennetts of today who still
insist that thought, idea or concept is just a specific neuronal state
in brain. (So forget social issues, because one day we'll understand
why and how it all comes from the genes...) 

In 'language-idealism' (or, linguistic idealism) we don't ask anymore
such "naive" questions as that concerning the basis or ground of
thinking and consciousness (on one hand, and 'ground of nature' on the
other). No way - instead we assure ourselves, that it's all just some
linguistic happening in our heads. Deridadaists and other
linguisterics, as Ricouer says, don't even care that there's no
meaning on sub-sentence level they keep chatting about - that is,
'sign', 'signifier' & al. don't yield to the level of meaning as long
as they aren't considered as parts of sentences. It surely is
important that linguists study, think and discuss the basic linguistic
elements, their roles and functions in meaningful discourse, but that
doesn't make it a substitute for basic philosophical analysis. Well,
it shouldn't do it - because that would mean degeneration and
sloppiness of philosophy (sort of rortyesque philosophical
baudrillardism). (Isn't that ironic, a sociologist defending
traditional philosophy instead of bashing it with 'differance' and
'desire'?)

So, in 'language-idealism' we have reflexive thinking reflecting its
linguistic nature (subjectivist trait), or discursively communicating
discussion on communicative nature of discursive reason (objectivist
trait). Great? 

And what about real? Is it really reducible into concept, as hegelian
idealists keep arguing? Is reality just a conceptual (?) extension of
self-reflexive, self-conscious subjectivity? Hard to swallow that
pudding.

When idealism is turned into social philosophy - its original insights
delivered by Hegel, as Hinrich Fink-Eitel in "Dialektik als
Sozialethik" tries to demonstrate -, then we get collective form of
'postmodernism' (or 'narcissism': ego-centred thinking) according to
which all there is, is first and foremost socially recognised by 'us'
in and through language (communication/discourse/whatever).

One main step on a way into this brave new theory was Marx with his
effort to turn Hegel's 'substance is subject' into social theoretical
conception of class as subject. Philosophically that doesn't make much
sense. Because the subject in question with all philosophy is
conscious individual who desperately asks, "what does this all mean?
what am I, and how am I related to reality?" Therefore, in
'bracketing' this real subject, Marx strenghtened the confusion over
subject and relationship between being and thinking.

Despite of Marcuse's and Adorno's (?) efforts to use Freud's
discoveries, frankfurters went along that hegelian-marxian way.
Finally J�rgen Sorgen denied any relevance of subject theory by
misunderstanding that what's at stake with psychoanalytic theory: he
refused to meet Freud ("metapsychology") on proper (basic)
philosophical terrain. Instead he concentrated on practice - remember?
one of the most fashionable words recently.. -, that is, on therapy.
And he misinterpreted it. By concentrating on language and
communication only, and bypassing what analysts always write about,
'transference'. There it was, real/-ity as it was happening on
micro-scale social interaction as both (conscious) communication and
(more or less unconscious) interaction on emotional level. Habermas
chose only one side of social interaction. And stated: that's it. 

Now we are getting into those petit parisians.

With all his anti-hegelian passion Gilles Deleuze tried to show that
and how it's impossible to stick to hegelian 'model' (of relations
between self-consciousness, philosophical system, and reality;
concentrating on reflexion and 'spirit' as intersubjective
conceptuality that grounds itself, and somesuch; and by-passing
questions of conditions and basis or ground of that 'spirit'), because
of its inherent idealist irrationality - though seeming rationality.
GD tried to show both in more or less traditional metaphysical
arguments (guess who's partly behind my metaphysical back?) and
'modern' linguistic arguments, that and how thinking, reason,
consciousness & al. do develop out of 'nature' (body as part of
nature), and that there's even sort of causality in this development.
- See "Logic of Sense" for linguistic arguments, and 'Difference and
Repetition' for metaphysical/ontological arguments.

Of course there are problems with Deleuze's philosophy: his
nietzschean ontology of power is more than questionable - not on moral
but on logical grounds - and his anti-dialectics might be interpreted
as one effort to build a new turn in european dialectics (it's a bit
different to relate him with indian dialectics), and, finally, his
'linguisterics' doesn't seem to consider the proper objective nature
of communicative/discoursive dimension of language; DG just swims in
the 'depths' of - how should I say? - Urlanguage, on the level where
there's not yet real or stabilised differences between 'subject' and
'object' and such.

Foucault with his archeologies tried to show the final misfortune of
modern idealist thinking: despite all their great disciplinary
practices modern (disciplinary) institutions were in the last analysis
incapable to wholly conquer the 'human body'. That is, despite of
their great efforts the scientifico-byrocratic machineries can never
submit human subjects as only their [machineries'] subjects. Even
reality of homo sapiens is such, that thought won't penetrate into
'depths' of it perfectly. *Practical* proof of impossibility of truth
of idealism...

Much of French 'transgression', 'desire' and 'delir�' bound ideas have
the same general contour. But this all is simply too general and won't
lead anywhere, so let's skip the rest of post-parisians. And back to
Deleuze:

GD truly has digged the same grave for hegelianism and
hegelian-marxism (that is, for idealists) as heideggerians,
deconstructionists and their kinds: common thesis has been (and now
I'm oversimplifying) that hegelians and habermasians - if there are
any major differences between them - can't provide a realistic account
of genesis of self-consciousness/language/reality and of their
differences; they can't ground them, and therefore their theories of
self-cons./lang./real. are just flying in thin air. (I've been
thinking to dig into Marx's 'youth and middle period' letters,
manuscripts and notes in order to see how extensively he really uses
Schelling's and Feuerbach's criticisms of Hegel. I would almost bet
that Marx don't mention too often his teachers, even in the cases
where his debt is clear - he was that kind of hypocritic.)

So basically, in my opinion, Deleuze & Foucault have been driven by
the same forces that are to be found behind Adorno and Marcuse. Dieter
Henrich and Manfred Frank have been repeating (sort of) that in late
18th century German idealism there were another strand to it, that of
Schelling, competing with (the winning) Hegel's conception of the
philosophical system. In 20th century some traits of that
'schellingian system' have been present in psychoanalytic theory and
in freudo-marxism, as well as in deconstruction, post-structuralism
and heideggerianism. I believe that it's essential for all marxist and
post-marxist thinking (or, politically: leftists) finally to figure
out what reasonable arguments have been skipped during the last
century or so because of ignorance or arrogance (or both) of marxists
(and leftists in general). In a sense, we are dealing with a more or
less the same 'philosophical unconscious trait' that once kicked
Marcuse and Adorno off their stable positions as well as a bit later
our post-petit-68's. Ken was wondering what makes us turning to
post-structuralism, and why. What if it's just this unbehagen of
modern culture: there's sharp and clean, almost sterile, theories but
we simply feel that there's something lacking in them, namely the
connection with reality. And as an alternative, the best we've been
offered have been those of Adorno, Deleuze, Derrida? Not a
particularly bright situation.

Ralph writes: "Central to his [some U.S. right-winger] intellectual
strategy is the attack on the Enlightenment, and support from such
thinkers as Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty."

Stalinism searched ideological support from Marx but that didn't turn
Marx into a stalinist. In a same way, some local rhetorician of Ralph
doesn't turn our cute post-boulevardians into fascists.

Shouldn't we finally take them philosophically seriously, instead of
that eternal jargon of their irrationalism? (Though, the best joke
about Deleuze & Guattari's "Mille Plateaux" was that some commentator
was 'hoping to find at least some reason in philosophy book'...)

But now is the time to make an end for such speculation. I'm just
wondering what people actually mean by 'reason'...

Yours, Jukka L