"Ratio" in Adorno

[Jeffrey]

Dear silent Critical Theorists,

This is a problem I worked on for over an hour today.  I intended on
e-mailing it to my prof., but I think it got too long. I think it'd be
intrusive -- just what this group needs, a little intrusion.

On page 30 of Aesthetic Theory (of the 1986 ed.) Adorno writes,

"Thrill is a subjective response to the cryptic inaccessibility of the new,
which in turn is a function of its moment of indeterminateness and
abstraction.  At the same time, thrill is mimetic behavior; it responds to
abstractness in mimetic ways.  Now, it is only through the new that mimesis
can be so firmly wedded to rationality that it will not regress, for
_ratio_ itself becomes mimetic through the thrill of the new."

First: To what does the "it" of "it will not regress" refer?  I take "it"
to be mimesis and not rationality.  Second: But what would make mimesis
regress?  Why does it need to be "firmly" wedded?  In other words, how are
Adorno's mimesis and rationality or "ratio" at odds with one another?

So:  The new links mimesis to rationality.
Mimesis: In AT I understand mimesis to be the subjective movement of art's
re-presentation of empirical reality; or simply, the subjectification of
objectivity.
The New: I think newness refers to the almost indefinable quality of the
mimetic movement -- subjectivity's subtle-yet-dramatic transformation of
that which it appropriates/re-presents. It's the "thisness" of actually
performing the mimesis.
Rationality: (Here's my biggest hole.)  Then R would be associated with the
objectivity of art's material base.  Is rationality simply a
descriptive/other word for empirical reality?  And if so: Is it because
empirical reality is rational in that it always has (something like)
direction -- while mimesis is closer to static, mirror-like reflection?

I think my confusion rests with some assumptions which I'm bringing to this
passage:  I characterize Adorno's "new" art as an "expressive mimesis" --
where mimesis is something like in Lukacs' objective reflection theory of
art and expression is what subjectivity adds to the equation.  So, if subj.
is on expression's side, then objectivity must be on mimesis'.  (L was
accused of being too objective.)  I usually associate direction and
movement with expression and subjectivity -- the life force driving one
forward.  And I usually associate stasis with rationality and objectivity.

Thus, if the difference between mimesis and ratio in the above passage
rests in the element of directiveness each possesses, then the problem is
how to reconcile this with my assumptions.  How can rationality or
empirical reality provide the expressiveness (direction)?  And how can
mimesis (subjectivity, in the passage above) provide the objectivity?
Somehow my dialectical wires have gotten crossed.  (Or maybe traitors and
spies should be built into the system!)

I think my problem is that I'm forcing these dialectics to allign
themselves in ways in which they don't feel so comfortable.  One solution,
one un-crossing of the wires, would be to concede expression and
subjectivity to rationality.  (After all we are the rational animal.)  And
giving mimesis over to objectivity and stasis is very comfortable.  (My
interp. of AT p30 is not set in stone; mimesis need not be the subjective
element in the dialectic.  Indeed, subjectivity's allignment with mimesis
was motivated more out an instinctual aversion (mine, its?) for rationality
than an identity with mimesis.)

However, instincts are strong, and coupled with the facts that a)
Expressionism the movement is characterized as being both resolutely
anti-rational and extremely subjective and b) Adorno links
indeterminateness to the thrill (subjective) of the new and to mimesis, I
am not comfortable with this first proposed re-allignment.

A second solution: Divorcing expression from the idea of direction.  So the
sides thus are: expression, subjectivity, mimesis and stasis against
realism, objectivity, rationality and direction.  The trick is twofold:
First, say that purely subjective expression is empty expression: w/o
material that is to be expressed, expression has no direction at all.
Second, L's theory of reflection is not mimetic.  Rather it's extremely
rational.  It's political impotence (I argue, despite its seeming
direction) could be characterized as such: realism is a train sitting on
the tracks without a driver.  Realism shows us the picture of the
situation, nice utopian alternatives and all, but it doesn't engage us in
that picture.


This second solution seems plausible, but I still don't see any easy way to
characterize the difference between rationality and mimesis.

Is this clear at all?

A few words in comment would be wonderful.


Jeffrey Broesche
Columbia U.